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Abduced-Principle Originalism





One of the most persistent criticisms of originalism' - and also one of
the most powerful-is that originalism is not a viable interpretative
methodology because of the tremendous technological, social, cultural,
religious, and moral change2 that has occurred since the Constitution's
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Denning, Melissa Hamilton, Jessica Knouse, Lou Mulligan, Rob Natelson, Mike Rappaport, Doug
Ray, Bill Richman, and Steve Safranek for their comments, the participants at the Michigan State
University College of Law and the University of Toledo College of Law workshops for this Article,
the participants at the Central States Law Schools Association and the Notre Dame Center for Ethics
and Culture conferences who commented on this Article, and Aditya Pawar, Kathy Prince, and
Robert Tucker for their research assistance. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the research
support for this Article provided by the University of Toledo College of Law.
i. By originalism I mean the interpretative methodology which holds that the Constitution's
original meaning-the publicly understood meaning of the Constitution's text when it was ratified-is
its authoritative meaning. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=I 12O244 ("[T]he fixation thesis is the claim that semantic content of the Constitution ... is
fixed at the time of adoption."); see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, io3 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2009) (manuscript at 2, on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
2. By the phrase "moral change" I mean that members of society today understand morality
differently than the various Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution. Perhaps the prime example of
this is whether and how justice is due to black Americans. The original Constitution-that is, the
(9271
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original meaning was created. The Constitution's original meaning arose
in contexts so dramatically different from our own, the criticism goes,
that a Constitution whose meaning was limited by those contexts would
be unworkable in today's world.
This form of criticism of originalism -what I label the challenge of
change-is pervasive.3 Justice Stevens, no fan of originalism, has
chastised originalists on the Supreme Court for failing to recognize that
"our understanding of the Constitution does change from time to time."'
In the academy, Mark Tushnet is representative when he claimed that
"the general problem of originalism ... is that social change makes it a
theory of constitutional interpretation that regularly fails to provide
guidance on matters of contemporary constitutional controversy because
it disregards the complexities of ... the current situation."' Nor is this a
new critique. Justice Douglas anticipated this argument in 1949, writing
that today's judge cannot let "men long dead and unaware of the
problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him."6 Indeed,
even scholars sympathetic to originalism, who argue that the
Constitution's original meaning is one means of ascertaining
authoritative constitutional meaning, find the challenge of change
compelling.7
Constitution unmodified by the Reconstruction Amendments-did not treat black Americans justly.
Today's Constitution, and today's Americans, by contrast, strive to treat all Americans justly,
regardless of race. Christopher Wolfe, The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANINGS AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS 213, 215-18 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr.
ed. I99I).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSITUTION 13 (2O01) ("The first
[problem with originalism], which others have stressed, involves the gap between the framers' world
and that which we inhabit."); Ronald J. Allen, Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure, i i CHAP.
L. REV. 277, 289 (2oo8) ("[A] lot of what matters to the criminal process exists in a world that simply
was not contemplated ... 200 years ago."); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 401 (I974) (claiming that originalism fails because of the dramatic
changes since the framing and ratification of the Fourth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 740-41 (1999) ("Applying the original meaning
of the language of the Fourth Amendment in a completely changed social and institutional context
would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text." (emphasis
omitted)); Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 192 (2ooo) (arguing that originalism fails because it prevents
judges from taking current circumstances into account); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Rehnquist Court
and State Sovereignty: Limitations of the New Federalism, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 459, 515 (2003) (stating
that originalism "disregards the reality of fundamental change in the nation's political and institutional
arrangements under the Constitution").
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).
5. Mark Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Loy. L. REV. 221, 229
(1987).
6. William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLuM. L. REV. 735,736 (1949).
7. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1636
(1997) ("Indeed, it is doubtful that the Framers understood the process of accommodation and
adjustment as broadly as I am suggesting; they probably envisioned a more bounded period of
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The challenge of change is especially pronounced in our society
because we have both a written Constitution and a society that has
undergone tremendous change in the period during which the
Constitution has been in force. Relatedly, originalism, by arguing that
the Constitution's authoritative meaning is its historically-bounded
meaning, ties itself to the "writtenness" of the Constitution8 and thereby
opens itself to the challenge of change.
Originalism's proponents have not answered the challenge of
change.' Instead, they have only noted the challenge in passing and
infrequently offered terse, often tentative responses." Justice Scalia, the
most prominent judicial proponent of originalism, has even conceded the
force of the challenge of change. Speaking of the punishments permitted
in 1791, he "doubt[ed] whether any federal judge-even among the many
who consider themselves originalists-would sustain" public lashing or
branding of the right hand "against an eighth amendment challenge.""
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia failed to explain why this is consistent with
a principled originalism, and he appeared to concede that it was not: "I
hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.
I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge,
upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging."'" This
Article, by contrast, will provide the first systematic description of the
tools originalism possesses to meet the challenge of change.
experimentation after which things would either have settled into place or we would try again. But
doesn't a conception that recognizes continuing evolution make sense, especially in light of our actual
experience with governing?"); Craig S. Lerner, Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure, IT
CHAP. L. REV. 277, 281 (2005) ("The basic criticism [of] originalism, of course, in bare bones, is that the
cultural, technological, legal environment has been so transformed over the past 210 years that the
original meaning of the Constitution does not and should not provide any or much guidance.");
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK.
L. REV. 1185, 1186 (2003) ("We then applied the insights of originalism that retain vitality in
addressing modem problems arising under the Commerce Clause, given the intervening two centuries
of change reflected in legislative practice and judicial precedent.").
8. See RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CoNSTITTON: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
100-17 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution's "writtenness" is central to originalism); see also KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 50 (1999) (arguing that "a written constitution requires an originalist interpretation").
9. Although he did not seek to comprehensively answer the challenge of change, Christopher
Green did thoroughly explain one of originalism's tools to meet the challenge: the sense-reference
distinction from the philosophy of language. Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-
Reference Distinction, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 555, 555-56 (2o06).
Io. See, e.g., KErH E. WHrlINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCrION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTrruTrONAL MEANING 208 (1999) (arguing that constitutional construction can enable the
Constitution's original meaning to meet changing circumstances); Wolfe, supra note 2, at 213-15
(noting that, over time, "the framers (and ratifiers) will not have thought of an increasing number of
problems arising" because of societal changes).
i I. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989).
12. Id. at 864.
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The challenge of change misses its mark. Originalism has the
interpretative tools to be sufficiently flexible in the face of changed
societal conditions. These six tools are: (i) an originalism of principles
(standards, and rules); (2) abduced-principle originalism; (3)
indeterminate and underdeterminate original meaning; (4) Article I and
state police power; (5) Article V; and (6) nonoriginalist precedent. I will
explain them below. In addition, however, I will show that originalism
retains sufficient inflexibility to possess the necessary virtue of having
"critical bite."
One of the six tools that originalists have used, but which they have
failed to articulate, is what I will label abduced-principle originalism.
Abduced-principle originalism, as I will describe it below, takes two
forms. The first form is where an interpreter abduces a legal norm-a
rule, standard, or principle-that fits the contemporary uses of the
constitutional term or phrase and thereby makes explicit the coherent
original meaning of the term or phrase that lay behind the uses. The
second form is where an interpreter abduces a legal norm that fits the
discrete practices that the Framers and Ratifiers 3 understood the
constitutional text in question to prohibit, require, or permit. This form is
and should be utilized only when there is no coherent original meaning.
Abduced-principle originalism is central to originalism's ability to
surmount the challenge of change.
This Article has four parts. First, it explains what originalism is.
Second, it reviews the challenge of change and how it has arisen because
of the tension between our written Constitution and our changed society.
Third, it describes the ways in which originalism appropriately mediates
that tension. These include six tools that I will explain in depth. Lastly,
this Article shows that, despite originalism's ability to meet the challenge
of changing social circumstances, it retains the virtue of sufficient
inflexibility to maintain the critical bite necessary for an interpretative
methodology to be principled.'4
I. EXPLANATION OF ORIGINALISM AS AN
INTERPRETATIVE METHODOLOGY
Originalism, in its most prominent current incarnation-often
referred to as the "New Originalism"I-is the interpretative
13. I use the phrase "Framers and Ratifiers" throughout this Article to refer to those persons who
drafted the Constitution and who authoritatively adopted it.
14. Originalism thereby avoids the opposite problem of being so accommodating of change that it
becomes nothing more than the best policy of the moment.
15. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 599, 599-600 (2004)
(describing the rise of original meaning originalism); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note ' at 18-
19 (same).
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methodology under which the Constitution's original meaning is
authoritative." The Constitution's original meaning is the publicly
understood meaning of the Constitution's text when it was ratified. For
instance, when the original Constitution 7 was drafted and ratified, the
text's meaning in light of society's linguistic practices from 1787 to 1791 is
its original meaning.
To ascertain the Constitution's original meaning, one would, after
studying the text and structure of the Constitution, review the debates
surrounding the drafting and ratification of the text in question, the
broader societal use of those terms, and the historical, cultural, religious,
and philosophical background against which the Constitution's text took
on conventional linguistic meaning. One may also ascertain and employ
the pertinent interpretative conventions of the time,"' although there is
substantial disagreement in originalist circles on this point.'9 Through this
largely historical inquiry, one would ascertain the text's publicly
understood meaning at the time of its ratification. As Keith Whittington
summarized, "[d]iscovering which of those meanings the Founders
intended requires historical investigation.""
For example, to ascertain the original meaning of "Religion" in the
First Amendment, one would look to how the term was used elsewhere
in the Constitution and the debates surrounding the drafting and
ratification of the First Amendment. One would also look to the broader
public debate over the First Amendment (and the Religious Tests
Clause"). From there, one would look to the historical, cultural,
religious, and philosophical usages of the term "Religion" in society at or
preceding that time. From these sources, one can reconstruct the
i6. See WHrriTNGTON, supra note 8, at 35 ("The critical originalist directive is that the
Constitution should be interpreted according to the understandings made public at the time of the
drafting and ratification.").
17. By the "original Constitution" I mean the Constitution as amended by the Bill of Rights.
18. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretative Conventions, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 519, 519
(2003) (describing the role of the Framers' and Ratifiers' interpretative conventions in originalism);
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, Original
Interpretive Principles] (arguing that to achieve the good consequences that use of originalism would
bring about, interpreters must utilize originalist interpretative conventions); John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, The Desirable Constitution and the Case for Originalism passim (Mar. 20,
2oo8) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Hastings Law Journal) (same).
I9. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note i, at 19-21 (describing the variance among
originalists).
20. Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism": The Role of Intentions in Constitutional
Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 214 (2000).
21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
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linguistic practices of society in 1791 and determine the original meaning
of "Religion. '
Originalists have offered a stunning variety of justifications for
originalism and the authoritativeness of the Constitution's original
meaning. For instance, the prominent originalist Randy Barnett, in his
elegant Restoring the Lost Constitution, has argued that originalism
ensures that natural rights are protected by the legitimate law making
processes that the Constitution's original meaning "locks in."23 Other
originalists have used different foundations. 4
Below, in Part III, section C, subsection four, I more fully explain
my own justification for originalism and how this unique foundation
better enables originalism to meet the challenge of change. In brief, as I
have argued elsewhere,25 the Constitution's original meaning is binding
because it enables our society to pursue the common good effectively
and, in turn, it enables each member of society to pursue his own good.
The Constitution's original meaning is the mechanism by which the
Framers and Ratifiers communicated to members of our society their
authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions on how to pursue the
common good 6 To best grasp the meaning of the Framers' and Ratifiers'
communications, interpreters must engage in a historical inquiry to
determine the contextualized meaning of the Constitution: its original
meaning."
Despite the flowering of originalist scholarship over the past thirty
years, and its increasing sophistication, 8 originalists have not responded
to the challenge of change. Indeed, given the pervasiveness of
22. See Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 181,
181-85 (2002) (using this process to arrive at the original meaning of "Religion" in the First
Amendment).
23. BARNETr, supra note 8, at tog.
24. See WHrrnNoToN, supra note 8, at iio-59 (grounding originalism in popular sovereignty);
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 8o TEX. L. REV. 703,
802-o5 (2002) (arguing that originalism is justified because it protects the good consequences that arise
from the Constitution's supermajority requirements); Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and
Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in
the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 909, 983-97 (2005) (using the
Aristotelian tradition's concept of the common good and the related concept of authority to justify
originalism). Lawrence Solum has also argued that one version of originalism, what he calls Semantic
Originalism, is compatible with most normative justifications for originalism. See Solum, Semantic
Originalism, supra note I, at 128-34.
25. Strang, supra note 24.
26. See Whittington, supra note 2o, at 213 ("[Mleaning arises through the act of communication
between the author and the reader.").
27. See id. at 212 (arguing that the historical context in which a text is written is necessary to
determine the text's meaning).
28. See JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITIcs: A CONSITUTIONAL
HISTORY i90 (2oo5) (describing how originalism, in the 199os, became more "subtle [and] complex").
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nonoriginalist critiques based on changed social conditions, originalists'
failure to take notice threatens the originalist project. Below, I describe
how originalism has ample resources to meet the challenge of change.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE
A. UBIQUITOUS SOCIAL CHANGE
One of the most oft-repeated criticisms of originalism is that it is not
a viable interpretative methodology because it would bind today's
society to the legal norms of the vastly different society that enacted the
Constitution. Daniel Farber, for instance, has argued that "[w]hat is
wrong with originalism is that it seeks to block judges from even
considering these later developments, which on their face seem so clearly
relevant to the legitimacy of [statutes under constitutional challenge]. 29
Farber found that the Second Amendment provided a good example
of originalism's inability to meet the challenge of change.3" The subject
matter of the Second Amendment, argued Farber, changed in ways that
undermined application of the Amendment to today's circumstances."
The need to protect both the ability of states to fend off an aggressive
federal government via a well-armed militia and the ability of individuals
to fend off criminals has been dramatically reduced by the rise of the
federal regulatory state. A similar argument based on changed
circumstances appeared in Justice Breyer's dissent in Heller v. District of
Columbia.33
Claims such as Farber's and Breyer's are attractive because, absent a
good reason, legal norms should change to meet new circumstances in
the society the norms govern. Legal norms that do not fit the
circumstances of their society cannot effectively coordinate the activities
of the society's members.' 4 This disjunction, this lack of fit, between legal
norms and social circumstances was the motivation for the progressive
and legal realist movements. Proponents argued that, for example, the
Supreme Court's liberty of contract doctrines, which hailed from an
earlier, simpler time, could not effectively deal with the problems that
arose in a newly urbanized, industrialized society.35
29. Farber, supra note 3, at 192.
30. Id. at 189-92.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2866-67 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the rise of
urbanization and police forces, among other changes, make modem application of the Second
Amendment's original meaning problematic).
34. See JOHN FINMS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231-33 (I98o) (describing the need to
coordinate members of society in their pursuit of their goods).
35. See MORTON J. HORWTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: I870-196o, at 187 (1992)
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The examples of change are numerous. Technological change is
one of the clearest examples of the phenomenon. The society that gave
us the original meaning of the Commerce Clause did not have methods
of communication and transportation-in fact, likely could not have
imagined our methods-that today are commonplace. The Internet, for
instance, transports, in the form of electrons and light, everything from
pictures to songs to books to conversations. The closest analogy in 1789,
at the ratification of the Commerce Clause, was traditional mail service.
Critics have not failed to focus on technological change."
But technology is not the only area of dramatic change. Society's
religious and cultural life has also been altered by the passage of time.
The United States of 1791, when the First Amendment was ratified, was
more Christian than today's United States. The percentage of Americans
identified as Christians was, as one would expect given immigration
patterns, high.38 Many states retained state established churches and,
even those that did not, officially recognized Christianity, or at the very
least theism.3 9 Today, by contrast, though Americans likely remain the
("All Realists shared one basic premise-that the law had come to be out of touch with reality."); see
also id. at 188 (noting that legal realist attacks on existing legal norms and practices were caused, in
part, by "the enormous upsurge of social change and class struggle in the late nineteenth century").
36. Richard Fallon has summarized the challenge of change facing originalism:
Most of the Constitution was written over two hundred years ago by an exclusive group of
white males, many of them slaveholders. The nation was still predominantly agrarian at the
time of the Constitution's ratification; the principal commerce was maritime.... [T]he
United States was not a world power. No one contemplated Social Security, Medicare, or a
nationally funded welfare system. In peacetime, the national government was expected to
play only a minimal role. The most transformative amendments to the Constitution came a
century later, following a bloody civil war. Even then, women remained excluded from the
franchise and, almost without exception, from the professions. Public education remained
inchoate; there were few great state universities.
FALLON, JR., supra note 3, at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
37. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Constitutional Rights and Technological
Change in Criminal Justice, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. io3, io6 (2002) ("[Ajdvocates of an 'original intent'
approach to constitutional interpretation face particular challenges in reconciling their interpretive
theory with significant technological changes.").
38. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 204 (1997) ("The Americans were
overwhelmingly church-going, much more so than the English ....").
39. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 3 (1982) ("A great many of the early American settlements were formed by dissident religious
minorities fleeing from the Protestant establishments of England, Ireland, and Scotland. Paradoxically
many Europeans who fled to the New World to escape established religion agreed that the Church and
State should be combined in their new settlements."); see also id. at 4 (describing some of the legal
privileges religion, and Christianity, possessed); Strang, supra note 22, at 220-24 (describing the post-
Revolutionary state experience).
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most religious Western country," the rate of Christian identification has
diminished,' and Christianity no longer has a legally sanctioned position.
Culturally, the society of 1789, or 1868 for that matter, was more
"conservative," as that term would be employed today in political
discourse, regarding many important issues. Possibly the most dramatic
change is in the area of sexual mores. While perhaps honored in the
breach, norms governing human sexuality privileged married,
heterosexual sexual intimacy.' Today, by contrast, marriage as the sole
forum for sexual intimacy sounds quaint.
The rise of urbanization and industrialization present the changes
that likely most altered the daily life of average Americans. Until i9io,
the United States was primarily a rural nation with its people living
either on farms or in small farm communities.43 Thereafter, and
increasingly, Americans lived in larger urban areas." Relatedly,
Americans of previous generations worked in agriculture or smaller
businesses but, since the late-nineteenth century, Americans have
increasingly come to work in larger businesses focusing on industrial or
other commercial endeavors.4" And today, the American economy is
postindustrial.
Criminal procedure offers a good vehicle to see the tension between
change and the Constitution because it is an area of the law in which
many of society's changes intersect. 6 Technology has led to investigative
techniques inconceivable to Americans in i79i, 4' societal changes have
40. See Andrew Greeley, Religion in Britain, Ireland and the USA, in BRmSH SOCIAL ATTITUDES:
THE 9TH REPORT 51 (Roger Jowell et al. eds., 1992) (finding that the United States is markedly more
religious than England and Western Europe).
41. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2004-2005, at 55 tbl.67 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prodl2oo4pubs/
o4statab/pop.pdf (finding that 77% of Americans identify as Christians and 4% identify as non-
Christian adherents); Gary Langer, Poll: Most Americans Say They're Christian, ABCNEws, July is,
2001, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=9o356&page=i (finding that 83% of Americans identify
themselves as Christian, with another 4% identifying themselves as adherents of another faith).
42. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The Disappearing Cornerstone
of the American Law of Marriage, 18 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 449, 462-70 (2004) (describing the nineteenth
century American law of marriage); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Unavoidable Influence of Religion upon
the Law of Marriage, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493, 500-13 (2004) (describing the nineteenth century
legal understanding of sex and marriage).
43. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING:
POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS: UNITED STATES 5 tbl-4 (1993), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/ceni99o/cph2/cph-2-I - r .pdf.
44. Id.
45. ARTHUR S. LINK ET AL., THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: A HISTORY 507 (Arthur S. Link et al. eds.,
i98I).
46. See Allen, supra note 3.
47. For example, the use of wiretapping that does not physically invade the property of the
suspect, as was the issue in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1967).
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led to the existence of a class of previously unknown professional
government employees who enforce the law and investigate
wrongdoing, ' and changes in our sense of justice have led, for example,
to appeals as of right for criminal defendants.49 In each of these instances,
the Supreme Court responded to change by crafting a nonoriginalist legal
norm which the Court justified by reference to societal changes.
One aspect of change that I will single out for special discussion is
alteration of social morality. Over time, Americans have changed their
beliefs regarding the licitness of many activities. Many of these changes
have found sanction in differing interpretations of (and amendments to)
the Constitution. For example, the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
century constitutional protection of economic activity from governmental
regulation 0 later gave way.' The constitutional protection and then
abandonment of that protection reflected changing social morality.
A moral realist53 could argue that the licitness of the subjects
regarding which society's view changed did not, in fact, change. For
instance, it has always been wrong, the realist would state, for the
government to treat people differently because of their race, regardless
of society's recognition of that fact. In other words, nothing has changed
other than perceptions.
Recognizing the validity of the realist's claim, it is still the case that
changes in society's views on morality are changes that the law should,
generally, take into account; that the law should fit. Moral realists,
including Saint Thomas Aquinas, recognize this.54
48. This change has resulted in the Court, for example, creating the Miranda warnings as a
mechanism to enforce the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,468-69 (1966).
49. In response to the creation of an appeals process and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), the Court ruled that indigent criminal defendants have a right to state-provided counsel.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,357-58 (1963).
50. Morton Horwitz has argued that the constitutional sanction given to "liberty of contract" was
a reflection of the dominant class's perception that freedom to contract was morally privileged and the
state was a neutral arbiter between citizens. HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 19-20, 33-36.
5i. See JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 766-68 (describing Franklin Roosevelt's court packing plan
and the Supreme Court's switch).
52. HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 19-20, 33-36.
53. See Geoff Sayre-McCord, Moral Realism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism ("Moral realists are
those who think that ... moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts
right."). For an example of moral realist claims, see ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW
17 (r999), stating that "new natural law" theorists claim that "basic practical principles... state[]
truths about what ought to be done."
54. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-I1, Q. 96, art. 2 (Benziger Bros. ed.,
Dominican Fathers trans., 1981) (c. 1265-1273) (stating that laws should fit the condition of the
members of society).
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Perhaps more importantly, the change in morality that has occurred
is not that Americans believe that only their perception of what is licit
has changed. Instead, Americans believe that they have come to a better,
more accurate, understanding of what in fact is licit. On this reading of
change, some-especially critics of originalism-perceive the
Constitution's norms as unable to (change to) fit this new, correct
understanding of what is licit. The originalist Constitution is therefore an
obstacle to achieving substantive justice because of its inability to
accommodate this change.
Since it is unlikely that many will contest the claim that there has
been great change over the past two centuries, I will not further belabor
the point other than to sound a note of caution. The transformation in
American society over the past two centuries can be and has been
exaggerated. A standard criticism of originalist claims in the scholarly
literature and Supreme Court opinions is that the factual presuppositions
that initially supported the original meaning have changed so
dramatically that it no longer makes sense to follow the original meaning.
Of course, if the factual presuppositions that undergirded the original
meaning have not been altered, or at least not materially so, this
regularly proffered criticism loses much of its strength.
For example, in the Religion Clause context, proponents of
nonoriginalist interpretations of the Clauses often claim that a
nonoriginalist interpretation is necessary because the Framers and
Ratifiers in 1791 could not have foreseen the rise of religious pluralism
and hence did not take that fact into account when crafting the Clauses.5
Laurence Tribe argued along these lines that "changed circumstances"
resulting in more religious pluralism than in 1791 have made it
"inevitable that the Supreme Court would modify the narrow
understanding of 'religion." ''5' Similarly, Dean Chemerinsky claimed in
his popular case book that "[t]he problems of using history in
interpreting the Religion Clauses are compounded by the enormous
changes in the country since the First Amendment was adopted. The
country is much more religiously diverse today than it was in 1791 .
This claim underestimates the scope of religious pluralism at the
time of the framing and ratification. It further underestimates the
Framers' and Ratifiers' knowledge of their world's religious pluralism
and the history of religious pluralism. They were concerned with
55. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 734 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (making a similar
argument).
56. LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 179-80 (2d ed. 1988). I have previously reviewed the
literature in this area, including the constant refrain of the rise of religious pluralism. See Strang, supra
note 22, at 204-10.
57. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUtMONAL LAW 1455 (2d ed. 2002).
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religious pluralism; in fact, religious pluralism on the state and local level
was the primary motivation for the inclusion of the Religious Tests and
Establishment Clauses."
The religious pluralism in 1791 America, it is true, consisted mostly
of Protestant Christianity. However, within Protestant Christianity, there
was a wide variety of doctrines and practices." Further, the existence of a
relatively large Catholic population centered in Maryland, 6, along with
vibrant Jewish communities, expanded the scope of religious pluralism
yet further.6' The Framers and Ratifiers were also aware of religious
pluralism -including atheism- throughout history and its continuing
existence in many parts of the world, especially in the Far East and
among the tribes that peopled the American frontier." Given their
concern with and knowledge of religious pluralism, the standard criticism
of the Religion Clauses' original meaning is, at a minimum, overstated.
Perhaps surprisingly, in a post-New Deal and regulatory legal
practice that has made such claims commonplace, the challenge of
change was not forcefully articulated until the latter part of the
nineteenth century." As Jonathan O'Neill has shown in his study of the
history of originalist arguments in American law, from the framing and
ratification until the end of the nineteenth century, originalist arguments
dominated constitutional law.64  However, with the advent of
progressivism in the political sphere and legal realism in the legal sphere,
originalism was first challenged and then eclipsed .
The time period of the rise of the challenge of change to originalism
bolsters my claim that the challenge of change arises out of the tension
58. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RiGTrrs: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 301 (1998)
(noting that the Religious Tests Clause was "a further gesture of religious inclusiveness and
tolerance"); see also id. at 32 (finding that the Establishment Clause "also prohibited the national
legislature from interfering with, or trying to disestablish, churches established by state and local
governments"); id. at 34 (noting that the Establishment and Religious Tests Clauses were meant to
protect the religious pluralism of the states and localities); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional
Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1843, 1851-52 (2006) (arguing that
Americans wanted the states to retain jurisdiction over religion).
59. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at io8-17, 204-11; SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 292-94 (1965); Smith, supra note 58, at 1851-53.
6o. JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 55-61.
61. Id. at 305-o7.
62. See FOREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTrTUON 5 (1985) (describing the deep historical learning of the Framers).
63. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. I, 4
(1998) ("Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, constitutional theory and practice sought a
relative continuity with the Founders' design. Since that time, however, as the nation has experienced
constant change, a different strain of thought-the idea of a 'living Constitution,' one that is
interpreted as evolving to keep pace with current events-has competed with originalism.").
64. O'NEILL, supra note 28, at 12-28.
65. Id. at 28-42.
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between our written Constitution and societal change. Prior to the end of
the nineteenth century, there had not yet been sufficient change to make
that tension problematic.
B. THE "CHALLENGE" OF CHANGE
Why is this dramatic societal change a "challenge" to originalism?
The argument, reconstructed, goes like this: (I) the failure of legal norms
to fit their society impedes the ability of those norms to serve their social
coordinating function; (2) the Constitution's legal norms are embodied in
its original meaning;6 (3) the Constitution's original meaning is context
dependent; (4) the context in which the Constitution's original meaning
was created is vastly different from our own; (5) the legal norms
embodied in the Constitution's original meaning do not fit today's
society; and, consequently, (6) the Constitution's original meaning fails
to effectuate the Constitution's social-ordering function.
Originalists agree that, to function effectively, legal norms must be
able to adequately perform their social coordination function.
Performance of their social-ordering function requires an adequate level
of fit. For instance, property law norms taken from an England whose
conception of ownership was grounded in feudalism do not work in
today's America, where ownership is focused on the individual.6 Hence,
property law is replete with cases rejecting the common law rule in favor
of a modern reformi8
Further, originalists agree that the Constitution's original meaning
embodies legal norms. As I explain below, originalists, when interpreting
the Constitution, seek to derive usable legal norms from the
Constitution. Usable legal norms are typically identified as including
rules, standards, and principles. Originalists also agree that the
Constitution's original meaning is the publicly understood meaning of
the Constitution's text when it was ratified. Hence, a public's
understanding of constitutional text-not to mention the norms
embodied in the text itself-will vary depending on then-existing social
practices, and economic, technological, cultural, and other circumstances.
For example, a society in which the legal traditions include, as a bedrock
66. This statement assumes that originalism is correct, a position that is not defended here.
67. See Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir. 1992)
("The use of the estate tail to keep ancestral lands in one family had provided landed British
aristocracy with a basis of social and political power seen as incompatible with either the ideals
underlying the American Revolution or the social conditions in the new states.").
68. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the adoption of the implied warranty of
habitability in place of the common law rules of independence of covenants and lessee beware. See
Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for "Abuse" of an Easement: Moving Toward
Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 933, 944-46 (2oo8)
(explaining the movement in property law to the implied warranty of habitability).
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concept, sovereign immunity, will interpret Article III's grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts differently than would a society that lacked
the concept of sovereign immunity. As I described above, the context in
which the Constitution was ratified was different from our own: in some
cases, such as technology, dramatically so.
However, originalists can rightly reject (5), and consequently the
conclusion (6), because they can show that, even though the
Constitution's original meaning was created in a different social context,
the original meaning does fit today's social reality and does perform its
social-ordering function, or that any unfitting original meaning is no
longer authoritative. I describe how in Part III, below.
Of course, the Constitution itself provides for changing its meaning
through Article V. Critics of originalism often dismiss this option as
impractical given the perceived strong need for change and the difficulty
of effecting change through amendment.69 I will discuss the power of
these criticisms below. Even assuming, however, that Article V is a
practical method to alter the Constitution's meaning, originalists should
explore other legitimate avenues by which originalism accommodates
change for at least two reasons. First, there is a widespread perceived
need to meet changing social circumstances. Second, as I laid out earlier,
there has been dramatic societal change in the last two centuries.
Lastly, it is important to note that all interpretative methodologies,
to a greater or lesser degree, have to address the challenge of change.
Originalism, though, is in principle particularly challenged because of its
special rootedness in history. The challenge of change has generated a
cottage industry of interpretative methodologies that try to "thread the
needle" between originalism and nonoriginalism in order to permit
change, but not too much.
Bruce Ackerman's work is likely the best example of this
phenomenon,'0 but there are many others." Ackerman argued that
69. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) i6o (2006).
70. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737
(2oo6).
71. See, e.g., SoTnRios A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: BASIC
QUESTIONS 165 (2007) (adopting Dworkin's moral reading of the Constitution, which "is a kind of
textualism" because it "describes the text as what it facially appears to be," but in its best light);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmCs
239 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court should enforce fundamental values with
widespread-or what will soon be widespread-acceptance); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION i-i (1996) (arguing that although the framers and
ratifiers textually embodied authoritative concepts, such as equal concern and respect in the
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American democracy is "dualist" because there are two forms of
lawmaking: ordinary or normal, and higher lawmaking.72 Higher
lawmaking occurs when "the People," create or adopt the law, and
ordinary lawmaking is everything else.73 Through this dichotomy,
Ackerman is able to preserve what are, in his view, constitutional
amendments, without opening the floodgates to nontextual change. Such
"amendments," including the changes that occurred to constitutional law
during the New Deal, are not formalized in the Constitution's text, but
they are part of the Constitution nonetheless because they were the
product of higher lawmaking.
While there is much that is intriguing about Ackerman's dualist
understanding of American constitutional law, I will show that
originalism itself has the resources to meet the challenge of change
without the difficulties that accompany dualism.74
In fact, in many areas of constitutional law, it is likely the case that
originalism is more open to changed social conditions than nonoriginalist
methodologies. This is because the Supreme Court has constitutionalized
many areas of social life that, under an originalist methodology, would
remain in the hands of legislatures. Abortion is likely the most prominent
example of this phenomenon.75 Prior to Roe, states were largely free to
respond to their citizens' perception of abortion's licitness. Following
Roe, a nonoriginalist decision, the ability of democratic bodies to
respond to change was significantly limited. This phenomenon has
occurred repeatedly over the nation's history. The Lochner era is
another such instance.
Fourteenth Amendment, current interpreters are authorized to employ the best conceptions of those
concepts); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-12 (198o)
(arguing that a representation reinforcing justification for constitutional judicial review permits future
courts to apply the "fundamental principles" in the Constitution to new contexts); JED RUBENFELD,
FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 178-95 (2OO1) (explaining the
"paradigm case" method, which privileges those actions that the constitutional text was
paradigmatically meant to proscribe or authorize, but only those actions); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, too HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1192-94
(1987) (offering a theory of interpretation that gives some precedence to the Constitution's text and
original meaning, but also utilizes other forms of argumentation).
72. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 70, at 6-7.
73. Id.
74. See infra Part III.
75. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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III. THE SIX MECHANISMS BY WHICH ORIGINALISM
ACCOMMODATES CHANGE
A. INTRODUCTION
There are at least six interpretative tools by which originalism can
accommodate social change. These mechanisms -individually to a
greater or lesser degree but, when taken as a whole-sufficiently meet
the challenge of change. Below, I describe each mechanism.
Abduced-principle originalism is the most innovative of these six
mechanisms. It provides a method to articulate determinate original
meaning when none would otherwise exist.
B. AN ORIGINALISM OF PRINCIPLES (STANDARDS, AND RULES) 6
Legal norms, including those embodied in the Constitution's original
meaning, could theoretically exist at an infinite number of levels of
abstraction, from a very particularized rule to a broadly encompassing
principle. Legal philosophers, however, have often analytically divided
the possible levels of abstraction of legal and other norms using a
tripartite division: rules, standards, and principles." Using this
framework-and adding another analytic tool, abduced-principle
originalism-I will argue that originalism is well equipped to tackle social
change. While originalists have hinted at the possibility of an originalism
of principles, none have explicated it.7"
As a general matter, the more frequently the Constitution's original
meaning-especially regarding its more important clauses7 -is abstract
76. Although I label this mechanism an originalism of principles, all three types of norms result
from using the mechanism, including standards and rules, not only principles.
77. There is substantial disagreement on what the differing types of legal norms are and the
respective characteristics of those types. See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 68 (1992)
("Few agree either on what rules are, or on what roles rules play, by contrast with other legal
standards."). The tripartite division of legal norms adopted in this Article reflects a common
convention. See Legal Theory Blog, Legal Theory Lexicon: Rules, Standards, and Principles,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/o6/legal-theory-le.html (June 1, 2o08, 14:56 EST) (giving
this division).
78. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
162-63 (i99o) (arguing that the judicial role includes applying constitutional principles to new
circumstances); Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, too HARV.
L. REv. 751, 758 (1986) (stating that the "general terms" of the text "are capable of governing
particular cases not envisaged by their authors" (citation omitted)); Michael W. McConnell, On
Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361-62 (1987) (arguing that constitutional
principles may be applied to new circumstances); see also Green, supra note 9, at 567 n.36 (listing
sources who suggest the possibility of applying principles to different situations than originally
envisioned).
79. By "more important clauses," I am referring to those portions of the Constitution that have
the highest product of frequency of use, broadness of coverage of social life, and the centrality of those
facts of social life covered. As an example, the Commerce Clause is more important than the Third
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rather than particularized, and the more the original meaning edges
toward greater abstraction when it is abstract, the better originalism can
accommodate change. This is done by applying the constitutional norm
to new situations." As Keith Whittington has argued, "the Constitution
will undoubtedly extend to new situations over time ... because entirely
new fact situations arise or because political chan e has brought certain
aspects of the text into greater prominence." ' Conversely, if the
Constitution's original meaning consists primarily of particularized
norms and does so frequently, then originalism will be less able to meet
the challenge of change. In other words, if the Constitution's original
meaning is composed more often of Privileges or Immunities Clauses,
rather than Presidential Eligibility Clauses, it has a greater ability to
tackle the challenge of change.
The first type of legal norm is the rule. One of the characteristics of
rules is that they cover a limited number of social circumstances. They
take the form of: if fact(s) A (B, C, etc.) exist(s), then result(s) X (Y, Z,
etc.).,2 Rules are limited by the limited number of facts they cover. Rules
become operative only in those situations characterized by the limited
universe of facts listed in a rule's application clause. 83 Rules have an on-
off quality. Only if the limited number of pertinent facts exists does the
result follow. They are also limited in the consequence(s) that a judge is
authorized to employ (listed in the consequence clauses8) if the rule's
facts exist.
A common example of a rule is: if a person drives over the
applicable speed limit, the driver will receive the applicable fine. There
are three facts from the rule's application clause: a person, a speed limit,
and the person driving in excess of the applicable speed limit. If one of
those three facts is absent, the rule is inapplicable and the consequence is
inapplicable. If all three facts are present, then the judge must order the
person to pay the applicable fine. The judge cannot impose on the
violator of the rule a different punishment because the judge is limited to
the consequence stated in the rule.
Rules often employ-and are most "rule-like" when they employ-
non-value-laden, relatively nonabstract, facts and consequences."~ For
Amendment's prohibition on quartering soldiers. See U.S. CONsT. amend. III.
8o. The situations could be new because situations of this type did not exist before, or they could
be new because they have not previously been subject to litigation.
81. WHIMrNGTON, supra note 8, at 104-O5 (citations omitted).
82. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 36-38 (i96I).
83. In the example used in the text, the application clause governed situations with fact(s) A (B,
C, etc.).
84. In the example used in the text, the consequence clause included result(s) X (Y, Z, etc.).
85. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381-83 (1985)
(distinguishing rules from standards based on whether the considerations employed by the norm are
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
instance, using the rule from the previous paragraph, the universe of
facts to which the rule applies does not call-at least not in the vast
majority of situations under which the rule would be invoked-for a
judge to employ contested, value-laden judgment. Instead, each fact is
fairly clearly defined as a social phenomenon. S6  Similarly, the
consequence is the relatively clearly defined payment of a monetary fine.
Rules may employ value-laden and abstract facts and consequences,7 but
in doing so they lose some of their most attractive quality: their
determinacy.
Rules can have exceptions89 and even exceptions to exceptions.' For
instance, if facts A, B, and C, then result Y, unless fact D obtains, in
which case result not-Y, unless fact E also exists, in which case result Y.
In practice, however, rules encompass relatively few facts and even fewer
exceptions. This is because rules lose their determinacy of application the
more facts and exceptions they contain.9'
Standards are less constraining than rules.92 They lack the on-off
quality that characterizes rules. Instead of a particular result following
from the existence of a specified (list of) fact(s), a standard directs the
decision maker to take into consideration a set of factors that will guide
the decision maker's decision. No one factor is determinative, and the
factors that guide the decision maker may themselves have varying
weights and hence influence on the decision maker's decision.
The standard provides the universe of factors that the decision
maker must utilize, but how the factors interact to produce a result is
"empirical" or "evaluative," with the former constituting rules and the latter standards).
86. For a discussion of the social construction of the scope of categories of human activity see
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 579-88 (1987).
87. In the agency context, for instance, section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
provides a nonexhaustive list of considerations to determine whether an agent is a servant or
independent contractor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). Many of the listed
considerations require the exercise of considerable judgment, at least in some cases. For instance, one
of the factors is whether the agent "is engaged in a distinct occupation." Id. § 220(2)(b).
88. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76
(1989) (offering a review of the benefits of rules as opposed to less discretion-constraining legal
norms).
89. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136 (196I) (noting that a rule with exceptions "is still
a rule").
go. For a prominent contrary view see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 115-16 (I991).
91. This is one reason why courts, when faced with a purported rule that is riddled with
exceptions, will often reformulate the rule to better fit the exceptions and case law in the area. See
Schlag, supra note 85, at 429.
92. For a good example of how rules and standards operate differently, see id. at 379-80,
describing the disagreement between Oliver Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo over the
standard of care for automobiles crossing railroad tracks, with Holmes advocating use of a rule and
Cardozo proposing a standard.
[Vol. 6o:927
May 2009] ORIGINALISM AND THE "CHALLENGE OF CHANGE" 945
not-or at least not necessarily-predetermined. The factors could each
have a specific weight, and the decision maker must determine on which
side the different factors fall and then balance the two sets of factors. Or,
the standard could direct that the factors will have different weights
depending on their interrelationship.9 Additionally, standards may, like
rules, utilize elements that are value-laden or abstract and hence provide
less constraint to the decision maker.
A common example of a legal standard from agency law is the test to
determine whether a servant acted within the scope of his employment
when committing a tort, thereby subjecting his principal to liability.9
When faced with a suit by an injured plaintiff who is seeking to recover
from the tortfeasor's employer, the Restatement (Second) of Agency
section 228 directs courts to utilize four considerations to decide the
issue.95 The Restatement (Second) of Aency limits courts' considerations
to those elements listed in section 228. As noted earlier, many standards
give more weight to some factors than to others, and section 228 does
this. Comment b indicates that the Restatement's drafters thought that, if
two particular considerations were present, then "there is an inference
that it was within the scope of employment."'
Principles, like standards, provide reasons that decision makers must
utilize. Unlike standards, however, principles do not preclude the
decision maker from employing additional considerations in making a
decision. Instead of providing the tools to resolve a particular issue, as do
rules and standards, Nrinciples have, in the words of Ronald Dworkin,
"gravitational force." That is, principles push or pull a decision maker in
one or another direction-they put their thumb on the scale, so to
speak.9 In the legal realm, principles often do this by organizing the
subsidiary legal materials: the rules, standards, cases, statutes, and legal
practices."
93. See BURTON, supra note 77, at 51-62 (discussing different understandings of weighing and
balancing of reasons).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (958) ("A master is subject to liability for
the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.").
95. Id. § 228.
96. See id.(stating that conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment "if, but only if" the
four considerations are present).
97. Id. § 228 cmt. b.
98. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY III (1977).
99. See BURTON, supra note 77, at 170 ("Principles have legal implications mainly when they
contribute reasons for or against the classification of a case ....").
ioo. Especially in the common law context, principles are less constraining than rules or standards.
They do not-at least not usually-dictate the outcome of a particular case. They offer reasons,
sometimes more and sometimes less strongly. Principles do not, therefore, vigorously constrain
decision makers. In rare cases, given the thickness of our legal practice's legal materials, especially
judicial precedents, a judge will have direct recourse to the principle that fits and justifies that area of
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The most famous example of this in the jurisprudential literature is
an 1889 case, Riggs v. Palmer.'° There, the New York statute of wills, if
read according to the conventional meaning of its text, appeared to
require that the named beneficiary under the testator's will inherit
despite the fact that the beneficiary murdered the testator.'° The New
York Court of Appeals rejected that reading of the statute."'3 Instead, the
court held that a common law principle-"[n]o one shall be permitted to
profit by his own fraud or to take advantage of his own. .. wrong" -
limited the application of the statute's rule. °4 The applicable legal
principle, held the court, organized the subsidiary legal materials,
including the statute's rule, to reach a conclusion contrary to the statute's
conventional meaning. 5
The relatively clean trichotomy described above does not account
for the frequency with which legal norms possess aspects of multiple
types of legal norms. "Most legal norms are hybrids, in that they have
both rule-like and standard-like elements."' 6
In this Article, the aspect of these three basic legal norms with which
I am most concerned is their ability to apply to new situations. I will
focus on the relative abstraction of the norms, or their component parts,
because this characteristic most readily permits a norm to apply to new
circumstances. Principles generally have, to a greater extent than rules or
standards, the ability to apply to new circumstances because of their
relatively greater abstraction. Principles are not limited, in the manner of
rules or standards, to a fact or discrete set of facts. Principles also, unlike
rules or standards, use component parts that cover a broad range of
social phenomena. Lastly, principles often employ component parts that
require value judgments. None of this is to say, however, that rules do
not have the capacity to apply to new situations; only that they do not
have as great a capacity as do principles and standards."
law. In other words, rarely will a judge apply a principle to a given set of circumstances. Instead, the
judge will rely on the governing principle to determine, for example, which of the competing legal
rules should apply and in what manner.
101. 22 N.E. i88 (N.Y. 1889); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 15-20 (I986) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE] (using Riggs to explain the role of principles in our legal practice); DWORKIN,
supra note 98, at 23 (same).
102. Riggs, 22 N.E. at t89.
io3. Id. at 191.
io4. Id. at 19o.
105. For another example of the courts' use of legal principles, this time from the property law
context, see Strang, supra note 68, at 948-49, describing the California Supreme Court's use of legal
principles to organize subsidiary legal materials in Tenhet v. Boswell, 554 P.2d 330 (Cal. 1976).
io6. Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOwA L. REv. 739,740 (1997).
Io7. See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles, supra note 18, at 379-80
(describing how rules can apply in ways contradictory to their creators).
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Principles (along with other legal norms, but to a greater degree
than those other norms) can apply in ways unforeseen °8 by their
author(s).'" In the Fourth Amendment context, for example, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly faced cases that presented circumstances
unforeseen (and unforeseeable) by the Amendment's Framers and
Ratifiers. A good illustration of this is Kyllo v. United States."' There, the
Court faced the question of whether a thermal image scan of a house,
which revealed information about the house's interior, was a search
within the Fourth Amendment's meaning. "' The Court ruled that the
image scan was a search."2 The Court relied, in part, on the reasoning
that the Constitution guaranteed a minimum level of protection for
homes and that the Court must ensure that new technology does not
erode that protection."3  "To withdraw protection of this minimum
expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.""' 4 The Court applied the Fourth
Amendment's principle of special protection to the home to a situation
unforeseen by the Framers and Ratifiers.
In fact, later judges applying a legal principle may apply it to
situations known to exist by the principle's author(s), but in a manner
contrary to how the principle's author(s) did or would have applied it."5
io8. A likely example of a legal rule applying in a manner unforeseen and differently from the
expectations of the text's framers and ratifiers is the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment concerns the President's "death." U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § I. At the time the
Amendment was ratified, in 1967, the nearly universal legal definition of death was irreversible
circulatory or respiratory cessation. See GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION:
A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 82 (1992) (discussing this example). Today, death is defined as brain death.
Id. Given the background against which the Amendment's framers and ratifiers worked, and their
goals, it is likely that the term's original meaning is what, in fact, constitutes death. This would include
today's more accurate conception of death.
io9. By authors of principles I am referring to, in the context of legal enactments, the authoritative
person or persons who enacted the legal principle into law.
110. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
iiI. Id. at 29-30.
112. Id. at 40.
113. Id. at 34, 40.
114. Id. at34.
115. This phenomenon may expand, beyond the two identified by Christopher Green, the class of
situations in which application of the text may lead to results contrary to what the Framers and
Ratifiers would have done. See Green, supra note 9, at 58o-8i (listing, as instances where applications
of constitutional text may change from what the Framers and Ratifiers expected, ignorance and error
regarding the "facts about the world"). If Green included within the category of "facts about the
world" moral facts, then Green's list was complete. For instance, if the Equal Protection Clause
embodies the moral principle of equal concern and respect, see DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 9-io, and
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that racially segregated schools were
consistent with that principle, they were incorrect, and Green may say factually incorrect. A proper
interpretation of the Clause, and its principle of equal concern and respect, requires elimination of
segregated schools. However, Green indicates that correctable Framer and Ratifier error does not
include errors of political morality. Green, supra note 9, at 58o-8i.
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A possible16 example of this is the relationship of the Equal Protection
Clause to de jure segregation. It is clear that a large number of the
framers and ratifiers of the Clause believed that the Clause was
consistent with racial segregation." 7 The framers and ratifiers of the
Clause were, therefore, relatively familiar"" with the same factual
circumstances that the Supreme Court would later face in Brown v.
Board of Education."9 If, as some have argued, the Equal Protection
Clause embodies a relatively abstract moral principle of equality, 2' then
the framers' and ratifiers' mistaken application of that principle to racial
segregation (and their conclusion that segregation does not violate the
principle) does not impede later interpreters from reaching a different
result.
This possibility draws on Ronald Dworkin's concepts-conceptions
distinction, and it shows that the distinction is consistent with
originalism.'' Dworkin has prominently imported the philosophical
distinction between concepts and differing conceptions of those concepts
into constitutional law.' 2 The Constitution, according to Dworkin,
embodies "broad and abstract" "moral principles.'2 3 The Framers and
Ratifiers, authoritatively adopted binding concepts, but they did not
intend to bind-indeed, could not bind-later interpreters to their
conceptions of those concepts.'24
ir6. I indicate that this is a "possible" example because whether the Equal Protection Clause in
fact embodies the moral principle of equal concern and respect, as opposed to a less abstract moral
norm or a relatively narrow rule, is an issue I do not address here. However, I do argue later that the
Clause is likely an example of where abduced-principle originalism applies. See infra Part IV.
117. See Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, i9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 457 (1996) (noting that an "impressive array" of scholars have concluded that, as
a matter of original meaning, "racial segregation in public schools was constitutionally permissible");
see also Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretative History of Modern Equal Protection, 9o MICH. L. REV.
213, 244, 252 (199) (noting that the District of Columbia and twenty-four of the thirty-seven states
had racially segregated public schools in 1868).
1i8. The extent of the framers' and ratifiers' familiarity with the negative effects of racial
segregation on equality is unclear. For instance, the Brown Court itself argued that public education in
1954 was dramatically more important and its impact better known than in 1868. See Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90, 493 (1954) (noting the changes in public education and education's
importance generally).
i19. Id. at 487-88.
120. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMrnNG OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
82 (i99o) (arguing that Brown was correct because it advanced the principle of "equality before the
law" which was "written into the text"); DWORKIN, supra note 71, at io (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause embodies "the principle that government must treat everyone as of equal status and
with equal concern").
121. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 201-02 (describing Dworkin's use of the concepts-
conceptions distinction in terms of principles and rules).
122. See DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 7-12 (describing this distinction).
123. Id. at 2.
124. See id. at 9 (stating that it is what the Framers and Ratifiers "intended to say," and not their
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Using Dworkin's terminology, the framers and ratifiers of the Equal
Protection Clause adopted an abstract concept of equality.125 Their own
conception of equality-under which segregation was consistent with
equality-was flawed and is not binding on subsequent interpreters.
Subsequent interpreters remain free to adopt a different conception of
equality.
In sum, if the Constitution's original meaning is composed relatively
more often of principles, and principles of a relatively high level of
abstraction, rather than rules or standards, then the original meaning can
readily apply to new circumstances. By contrast, rules created in the
different society of 1787 will strongly bear the mark of that society and
will be relatively more bounded by the facts as they existed in that
society.
It is uncontroversial that the Constitution embodies all three types
of legal norms. 26 A commonly given example of a constitutional rule is
the requirement that the President be thirty-five years of age. '27 The
Clause states that if a person is (i) thirty-five, (2) years, and (3) of age,
then the person can be President. ,2 The Clause limits the relevant
universe of facts to a small number: three.' 9 It requires that those three
facts must be present in order for a person to be President. In addition,
each of the three facts is relatively free of ambiguity and vagueness, 3'
and hence their application to concrete cases is relatively determinate.
The relative "ruleness" of the Clause does create difficulty in
responding to change. Arguably, as presently constituted, the Clause
does not take into account the relatively longer maturation period for
modern Americans in contrast to the founding generation. Members of
the founding generation, at a relatively young age, performed at the
"expectations" about application, that are binding).
125. I am not making any claim here regarding whether the Equal Protection Clause, in fact,
embodies an abstract moral principle. As I articulate below, the type of legal norm that constitutional
text embodies is a historical question. See infra notes 153-59, 188-98 and accompanying text.
126. See BARNETr, supra note 8, at 123 (explaining the different types of standards embodied in the
Constitution); DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 7-9 (discussing various constitutional clauses as examples of
the different types of norms and levels of abstraction contained in the Constitution); Whittington,
supra note 20, at 202 (using as examples of constitutional clauses of varying degrees of abstraction the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and Article II's age requirement for Presidents); id. at 216
("There is little question that the Founders meant to convey principles through their use of relatively
broad language.").
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 5; see also BARNETr, supra note 8, at 123 (commenting that this
provision is the "most oft-cited example of" a "rule-like" provision).
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 5.
129. One could also say that there are four requirements to be President. The fourth requirement
would be that one must be a "person." See id.
130. See BARNETr, supra note 8, at 119 (distinguishing these two concepts).
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highest levels of state and society, and with exemplary skill. 3' For
example, some of the most influential and important members of the
Philadelphia Convention-including Alexander Hamilton and Edmund
Randolph-were below thirty-five, and James Madison was only thirty-
six.'32 Indeed, the average age of members of the Convention was forty-
two.'33 Today, by contrast, it is rare for persons of that young age to play
important roles in society. The average age today of members of
Congress is fifty-seven years, "among the oldest of any Congress in U.S.
history."'34
A possible example of a standard is the Necessary and Proper
Clause.'35 The Clause permits Congress to enact laws that are both
"necessary" and "proper" to the execution of Congress' enumerated
powers., 6 Scholars have argued that judges, when faced with the question
of whether a statute is constitutional under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, must utilize a number of elements to make the determination.'37
Judges must, of course, determine whether the statute is necessary, and
proper, but both elements can be further particularized. A statute is
necessary if it is more than simply convenient, but it need not be
indispensible or absolutely necessary.': Also, a statute is proper only if:
(i) it does not violate individual rights, (2) it does not violate the
separation of powers, and (3) it does not violate federalism.'39 A judge,
therefore, must utilize all of these elements to arrive at a conclusion of
whether a given statute is constitutionally necessary and proper.
The Necessary and Proper Clause has a relatively robust capacity to
apply to new circumstances. Its component parts are relatively capacious
in their sweep, in that they can bring within their sway statutes
addressing any subject within Congress' enumerated powers. Justice
131. For example, the thirty-six-year-old James Madison was one of the principal authors of the
Federalist Papers, an "incomparable exposition of the Constitution, a classic in political science
unsurpassed in both breadth and depth by the product of any later American writer." RICHARD B.
MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-89, at 309 (1987).
132. The Age of the Framers in 1787, http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/
delegates/age.html (last visited May 17, 2009).
133. Individual Biographies of the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, http://
www.teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/delegates/ (last visited May 17, 2009).
134. See MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE I IOTH CONGRESS: A PROFILE
2 (2008), available at http://I56.33.195.33/reference/resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf. Complete data on
congressional age is unavailable prior to 19o7. Id. at n.4.
135. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
136. Id.
137. See generally BARNETr, supra note 8, at 153-90 (describing the Clause's original meaning);
Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 285-326 (1993) (same).
138. BARNETT, supra note 8, at 178.
139. Lawson & Granger, supra note 137, at 326-34.
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Scalia's concurrence in Gonzales v. Raich is an example of how the
Clause may apply to unforeseen activities-the market for illicit drugs-
that Congress seeks to regulate under its Article I powers. 4°
Scholars have argued that Article IV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause'4 ' embodies the principle that states must give citizens of other
states the rights a state gives its own citizens. Akhil Amar has called this
the "interstate-equality principle."'42 This principle applies to new forms
of state discrimination against noncitizens. For instance, in Saenz v. Roe,
the Court struck down a California statute that gave reduced welfare
benefits to new residents during their first year of residency.43
Given that the Constitution does contain, not only rules, but also
more capacious standards and principles, which of these types of legal
norms predominates in frequency, and regarding the most important
constitutional provisions, is an empirical question. Critics of originalism
have not, to my knowledge, provided significant evidence on this point.
Instead, originalist scholarship has identified many and important
constitutional provisions the original meaning of which is a standard or
principle." This finding fits both the historical data from the period of
the framing and ratification, and what reasonable persons would do
when creating the Constitution in the context of the framing and
ratification.
First, the Framers and Ratifiers were cognizant of the challenge of
change.'4" Philip Hamburger summarized the history finding that the
Framers and Ratifiers "strove for a constitution that would survive
changes in American society and therefore attempted to exclude from
the Constitution all that might become obsolete."'' 6 They had witnessed
the Articles of Confederation's inability to adapt to the changes that
took place following the Revolution and its consequent failure.'47 To
ensure that the Constitution would not meet the same fate, the Framers
and Ratifiers attempted to include only those provisions that would not,
with time, become obsolete.' One of the mechanisms they utilized to
achieve their goal of permanence was to give the national legislature
140. 545 U.S. 1, 33-42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I, cl. I.
142. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTrrrLrON: A BIOGRAPHY 254 (20O5).
143. 526 U.S. 489,492.498-507 (1999).
144. Over the past twenty-five years, there has been a flowering of scholarship aimed at identifying
the Constitution's original meaning. See, e.g., O'NEILL, supra note 28, at 192.
145. See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 240-42 (1989).
146. Id. at 325.
147. Id. at 276.
148. Id. at 242.
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discretion to meet unforeseen situations. 4 9 Another mechanism was to
embody principles in the Constitution's text, principles that would apply
to changed future circumstances.'50
This makes sense if one is creating a governmental structure
intended to be a "novus ordo seclorum: a new order of the ages.' 5 ' A
reasonable person in the position of the Framers and Ratifiers would
"draw their Constitution loosely enough so that it might live and breathe
and change with time.
''
152
The question of which type of legal norm a constitutional text
embodies is primarily an empirical and not a normative question.'53 To
determine what form the legal norm in question takes, one must conduct
a historical inquiry into the original meaning of the constitutional text.
That inquiry will reveal, if the historical data is sufficiently determinate,
whether the original meaning is a legal rule, standard, or principle.' 4
The inquiry is historical and not normative because the purpose of
interpreting the Constitution is to advance the common good which, in
turn, requires respecting the authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions embodied in the Constitution's text. In other words, one is
seeking to best understand the communication from the Framers and
Ratifiers to society, and thereby respect their authority to resolve social
coordination problems. This is a question of historical fact.
Consequently, Ronald Dworkin's attempt to make originalism the
"best it can be" through use of what he has labeled, "semantic"
originalism, fails to respect the Framers' and Ratifiers' authority.'55
Dworkin has argued that interpreters should distinguish between two
forms of Framer intent: abstract or semantic intent, and concrete or
application intent."6  Using his distinction between concepts and
149. Id. at 287-97.
i5o. See Christopher Wray, Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure, II CHAP. L. REV. 277,
292 (2005) (stating that "there are very broad terms reflecting broad principles that the framers chose
deliberately knowing that they were not going to be able to anticipate techniques and technologies").
There are, however, other circumstances that may have pushed the Framers and Ratifiers to a more
rule-like original meaning in some contexts. They may have meant, because they recognized that a
particular issue was or may become contested, for some constitutional text to embody their particular
understanding. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 221-22.
151. McDONALD, supra note 62, at 262.
152. Id. at 293.
153. See BASSRAM, supra note io8, at 79-83 (arguing that it is an empirical question whether the
Framers' and Ratiflers' semantic intentions were to adopt natural kinds or conventional meanings
when they drafted and ratified constitutional text).
154. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 213-14 (arguing that one must utilize a historical inquiry to
determine what form of legal norm the constitutional text contained).
155. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MArrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND TE LAW 115, 116-22 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
156. Id. at 116-17, 119.
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conceptions,'57 Dworkin claimed that later interpreters are bound by the
Framers' abstract intentions, embodied in the Constitution's text, but not
their concrete intentions."' Dworkin has offered various reasons for
choosing abstract over concrete intentions, with the most powerful being
the normative claim that better interpretations result from his
approach.'59
However, Dworkin's a priori choice of abstract over concrete
intentions fails to respect the Framers' and Ratifiers' authority to resolve
social coordination problems. In formulating the means to overcome
specific coordination problems, and in choosing how those means would
be embodied in the Constitution, the Framers and Ratifiers (usually)
chose a legal norm to perform the intended coordinating function.'6" This
legal norm had a particular- (often) historically accessible -level of
abstraction.'6 ' The choice of legal norm and of level of abstraction was
part and parcel with the Framers' and Ratifiers' choice of means to
overcome the coordination problem towards which the constitutional
text was aimed. Dworkin would disregard their choice.
This criticism of Dworkin's choice of abstract over concrete
intentions does not mean that the Constitution's original meaning is
always, or even frequently, concrete. Instead, it is an empirical question
regarding what form-and level of generality-the Constitution's
original meaning takes. This Article does not answer that question
generally but, as noted above, the literature does suggest that the
Constitution's original meaning takes all three forms with multiple levels
of abstraction. Answering the question of generality by looking
historically to the Constitution's original meaning also comports with the
respect due the Framers and Ratifiers as authoritative lawmakers, and
thereby advances the common good by ensuring the effectiveness of their
authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions.
It may be the case that some (perhaps many) of the Constitution's
norms embody, not only an abstract principle, but a principle of critical
morality. ' Keith Whittington has similarly noted: "The question of
whether a term is meant to be used in a conventional sense is a specific
157. Id. at i117.
158. Id. at 116-22.
159. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 203-07 (summarizing these arguments).
t6o. It is the case that, as discussed below, there was sometimes no coherent original meaning-no
actual choice-regarding a legal norm. See discussion infra Part III.C.4.
161. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions on Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 236-58 (1988) (responding to the claim that it is
difficult or impossible to recover the Constitution's original meaning).
162. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 208, 216 (noting the place for "moral theorizing" in
originalism).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
one, and turns on the intentions of the speaker."' 63 The difference
between these two types of principles-conventional moral principles
and critical moral principles-is that the first is drawn from conventional
morality while the second is drawn from critical morality.' A principle
drawn from conventional morality takes its content from conventional
beliefs regarding the content of the principle. This content may or may
not accurately reflect the requirements of critical morality. A principle
drawn from critical morality has, as its object, an accurate statement of
the requirements of morality, regardless of what society believes on the
subject.'
65
A judge faced with the task of interpreting a critical moral norm
embodied in the Constitution will use both his speculative'6 and his
practical reason' 67 to determine, resTectively, how best to define and
apply the moral norm in the case.' The judge's analysis will include
determining the best conception of the critical moral norm in question.'6
For instance, the judge would need to decide whether to use a
conception of justice at home in the Aristotelian tradition or the Kantian
tradition, or some other conception, if the case involved interpretation of
the Due Process Clauses (assuming the Clauses embodied the critical
moral concept of justice)." Then, the judge would have to apply that
conception of justice to the situation presented in the case.
Lastly, the well-accepted distinction in the philosophy of language,
between sense and reference, bolsters my argument for an originalism of
principles. 7' Sense is the meaning of a text that identifies and
163. Id. at 219-20.
164. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 20 (1963) (describing conventional morality as
"the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social group," and critical morality as "the
general moral principles used in the criticism of actual social institutions including positive morality").
165. Brian H. Bix, Raz, Authority, and Conceptual Analysis, 50 AM. J. JuR. 311, 312 (2005).
166. See AQUINAS, supra note 54, Pt. I-II, Q. 79, art. 2 (describing the speculative intellect as
directed toward the attainment of truth).
167. See FINNIS, supra note 34, at 100-27 (describing the requirements of practical reasonableness);
see also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20
HOFSTRA L. REv. 245, 251-52 (1991) (distinguishing between practical reasoning generally and a
specific form of practical reasoning utilized in the legal profession, legal reasoning).
168. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 216 ("Those real moral concepts must be explored
theoretically in order to be explicated and ultimately applied in a judicial context."); see also Lee J.
Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common
Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 49, 484-86 (2006) (describing how judicial virtue is necessary for judging).
169. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 219 ("The interpreter's task [regarding conventional
principles] is to discover the appropriate convention, but in the second it is to discover what [the
nature of the critical moral principle] is 'in fact."').
170. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 387 (1988).
171. Gottlob Frege is credited with developing this terminology. Gottlob Frege. Uber Sinn und
Bedeutung [Sense and Reference], translated in 57 PHIL. REV. 209 (948); see Green, supra note 9, at
563-74 (providing the most thorough discussion of the distinction in the law review literature); see also
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encompasses the text's referents. A text's sense provides the analytic
mechanism connecting the text to its referents. This mechanism is the
"set of identifying properties or descriptions associated with [the text]. ' 72
For instance, if the text in question is "human," its sense is animals of the
species Homo sapiens. Referents, by contrast, are objects in the world
identified by the sense of the text in question. Recurring to our previous
example of "human," Aristotle would be a referent.
The distinction between sense and reference, and related philosophy
of language concepts,'173 helps originalism meet changing circumstances
because the Constitution's sense can apply to referents not in existence
when the Constitution was ratified. If, for example, the publicly
understood referents of the Cruel Punishments Clause'74 of the Eighth
Amendment included ten specific examples of wicked government
punishment, that does not exhaust the possible referents to which the
Clause may apply. If, as is likely the case, the Clause's sense was
approximately those punishments that are, in fact, cruel punishment,
then the Clause's sense can apply to new referents not in existence when
the Clause was ratified. It could apply, for instance, to the electric chair.
The Clause's sense could also apply to known practices in ways
contrary to the Framers' and Ratifiers' understandings. This could be the
case regarding the death penalty, for instance. Despite the Framers' and
Ratifiers' beliefs that the death penalty was consistent with the Eighth
Amendment, later interpreters could legitimately conclude that the
death penalty is unconstitutionally cruel if it is, in fact, cruel. '
75
A constitutional text's sense is analogous to the legal norms
embodied in those texts, such as rules, standards, and principles, that I
have been discussing above. Both a constitutional text's sense and the
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting the Constitution in Its Second Century, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 677, 694-
95 (2000) (explaining that the distinction between sense and reference has been utilized by the
Australian High Court); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L.
REV. I, 1 (2000) (same). Gregory Bassham has noted the challenge presented by proponents of the
causal theory of reference. BASSHAM, supra note IO8, at 75-78. I agree with Bassham's argument that
the Framers' and Ratifiers' semantic intentions is an empirical question. See id. at 79-83.
172. BASSHAM, supra note 1o8, at 75; see also Stephen P. Schwartz, Introduction to NAMING,
NECESSITY, AND NATURAL KINDS 13, 15-16 (Stephen P. Schwartz ed., 1997) (describing "description
theories" of meaning).
173. For example, John Stuart Mill used the terms "connotation" and "denotation." JOHN STUART
MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 34-41 (8th ed. 1872). Rudolf Carnap also used the terms "intension" and
"extension." RUDOLF CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY 177-79 (1947); see also Green, supra note 9, at
56o-6i, 563-74 (describing sense and reference, and related terms).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Here, I am focusing only on the "cruel" portion of the Clause, not
its "unusual" portion.
175. The situation where a later interpreter can apply the original meaning in a way contrary to the
Framers' and Ratifiers' understood referents may be limited to where the Constitution's sense is a
critical moral principle, not a principle of conventional morality.
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legal norm it embodies are the means by which meaning is
communicated; they both connect the text to its objects. The widespread
recognition of the validity of the distinction between sense and reference,
and its close relationship to legal norms, supports my claim that an
originalism of principles can meet the challenge of change.
The distinction between sense and reference is also analogous to the
distinction between legal norms and the original applications of those
norms. I will discuss this relationship further in the next section, where I
explain the second form of abduced-principle originalism.
C. ABDUCED-PRINCIPLE ORIGINALISM
i. Introduction
I use the label abduced-principle originalism to refer to two distinct
though related phenomena. The first is where there was a societal
consensus on a constitutional text's original meaning, but that meaning
was not-or at least not frequently-made explicit. The second is where
there was no societal consensus on a constitutional text's original
meaning, and instead there was a consensus only on a discrete set of
practices-what I label archetypal practices-that the text would permit,
proscribe, or require. '76
Both types of abduced-principle originalism abduce a norm-a rule,
standard, or principle-to fit their respective data. They differ, however,
in their respective data sets. The first form focuses on contemporary uses
of the constitutional term or phrase, while the second focuses on the
practices that the Framers and Ratifiers believed the term or phrase
required, proscribed, or permitted.
The two forms of abduced-principle originalism are related because
they utilize the same process to ascertain the Constitution's original
meaning, and both provide mechanisms to increase the area of usable
original meaning. Interpreters can, in turn, apply these usable norms to
new circumstances.
A note of explanation before proceeding. Although I label this
mechanism abduced-principle originalism, all three types of norms are
produced using the mechanism, including standards and rules.
176. At this point, I have not yet definitively determined whether the pertinent group of people to
determine which practices were archetypal practices is only the Framers and Ratifiers, or if it includes
the entire society, though, as my language indicates, I tentatively believe that the relevant group is the
Framers and Ratifiers. Throughout my discussion of abduced-principle originalism, I will use the
phrase "the Framers and Ratifiers" without distinguishing between them and the rest of society.
[Vol. 6o:927
May 2009] ORIGINALISM AND THE "CHALLENGE OF CHANGE" 957
2. The Process of Abduction
Abduced-principle originalism relies on the form of reasoning
177
variously described as "abductive inference, ' 078 "inductive inference,.' 79
and "analogical reasoning in law."'" Abduction is the process of
"discovering the rules to be applied, of making sense of patterns of
characteristics, and of putting characteristics into rule-like patterns."''8
The process of abduction has four steps: (I) identify the data in need of
explanation, (2) articulate hypotheses to explain the data, (3) test the
hypotheses to determine which best explains the data, and (4) the best
hypothesis is applied to new data in need of explanation."2 At step (3),
the reasoning must utilize "analogy-warranting rationales" to test the
possible hypotheses.5
Abduced-principle originalism follows this process. Using abduced-
principle originalism based on archetypal practices as an example: first, a
judge must identify the data, the archetypal practices regarding which
there was a consensus. Second, the judge must put forward possible
norms that explain the data.'8 4 Third, the judge will test the possible
norms utilizing fit and, if necessary, the Framers' and Ratifiers'
perspective,'8 5 to ascertain which norm is the best explanation of the
archetypal practices." Fourth, the judge will apply that norm in the case
before him, the case that had required him to articulate the constitutional
text's original meaning through the process of abduction.
177. For a basic overview of different types of arguments, see Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Logic for
Law Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer, 69 U. Pnrr. L. REv. 1, 1 (2007).
178. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal
Arguments by Analogy, 1O9 HARV. L. REv. 923,947 (1996).
i79. Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDuc.
365,365 (1998).
18o. Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 525 (1998).
There is vigorous debate on the existence of and scope of abduction. See id. at 531-33 (arguing that
abduction is not a separate form of reasoning); Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1179, 1 186-94 (i999) (defending analogical reasoning); Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, io6 HARV. L. REv. 741 (993) (same); Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing:
A Review of Cass R. Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 531,
531 (997) (criticizing Sunstein's claims).
181. Brewer, supra note 178, at 978.
182. Id. at 947-48, 962-63, 98o-81,983.
183. Id. at 962-63.
184. In my experience, when one is engaged in the historical research to ascertain a text's
archetypal practices, a number of plausible norms that could explain the practices are themselves
present in the historical materials.
185. By the Framers' and Ratifiers' perspective I mean approaching a given issue with their
knowledge and purposes; to approach the issue in this manner one would arrive at a conclusion that
can fairly be called the Framers' and Ratifiers'.
186. Following Professor Brewer and others, I argue here that the analogy-warranting rationale
against which the norms are tested is supplied by fit with the archetypal practices and the Framers' and
Ratifiers' perspective.
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3. Abduced-Principle Originalism Based on Coherent, if
Unarticulated, Original Meaning
The first type of abduced-principle originalism is a method of
making explicit the usable legal norms embedded in contemporary
linguistic practice. It is the analysis used to derive original meaning from
the contemporary uses of the term or phrase in question. Although no
originalists have articulated this method, its use by originalists is
pervasive. In fact, it is what most identify when they think of the process
of originalist interpretation. Further, since the method simply makes
explicit the constitutional text's original meaning, my articulation of it
should be relatively uncontroversial.
To uncover the original meaning of a constitutional provision,
originalists investigate the historical record. Given the thick, though
relatively unreflective linguistic practice during the framing and
ratification period, one does not always find an explicit articulation of the
meaning of a text.""7 Instead, from reviewing the historical record, it is
often clear that the text had a commonly accepted, though unarticulated
public meaning. This is clear because usage of the term or phrase is
consistent, and this consistency is discerned from the usages' various
contexts. In this situation, the originalist will test which of a stable of
candidates for a term's or phrase's original meaning best fits the usages
of the term or phrase.
Attempts to discern the Commerce Clause's original meaning show
use of this form of abduced-principle originalism. Randy Barnett, for
instance, has used this method.'8 Barnett surveyed the "use of the term
'commerce"" ' during the period of framing and ratification, and in the
Constitution itself.'" He sought to find a meaning that fit the numerous
instances in which "commerce" was used during this period. For
example, in reviewing use of the term during the Constitutional
Convention, Barnett argued that the terms "'trade' or 'exchange' could
be substituted for the term 'commerce.".... By contrast, the phrase "any
gainful activity" was not a possible substitute.'92 Stated differently,
Barnett asked which of a stable of different plausible meanings-"trade,"
"exchange," or "gainful activity"-best fit the instances in which the term
''commerce" was used.
187. This should not be surprising. When people communicate through language, they do not stop
at the completion of each term or phrase and make explicit the meaning of that term or phrase.
Instead, assuming the communicants are participants in and familiar with the language's practice, each
participant assumes that the other knows the meaning of the terms and phrases used to communicate.
188. BARNETr, supra note 8, at 278-97.
189. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
i9o. id. at 278-91.
191. Id. at 280.
192. Id.
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Ultimately, after determining the original meaning of the component
parts of the Commerce Clause, Barnett stated the Clause's original
meaning in the form of a legal rule: Congress has the power "to specify
how a rightful activity may be transacted[,] and the power to prohibit
wrongful acts" in "the trade or exchange of goods[,] including the means
of transporting them[,] ... between persons of one state and another."'"
Barnett concluded that this rule was the one that best fit the historical
data-the use of the term "commerce"-of the Commerce Clause's
original meaning.
Similarly, in my own research into the original meaning of the term
"Religion" in the First Amendment, I found that very infrequently did
the Framers and Ratifiers, much less members of contemporary society,
articulate the term's meaning.'94 But it did happen; in Noah Webster's
first dictionary, for instance. 9 This, and other early sources, provided
candidate norms that I tested for fit with uses of the term "religion"
during the framing and ratification period.' 6 I found that a rule-a belief
in a god, with duties in this life and a future state of rewards and
punishments-best fit the historical data.'"
This method of making the Constitution's original meaning explicit
fits with how we use language. Normally, we do not articulate the
meaning of terms and phrases we use because we assume that the
addressees, as participants in our linguistic practice, are familiar with
their meanings. There are occasions, however, where, because of
miscommunication, use of a contested term, or some other reason, we
must articulate the meaning of terms or phrases used.
An easy example of miscommunication would be where Thomas
asks his neighbor Jacques, who is new to the United States, to "cut his
grass." Jacques comes over to Thomas' with a scissors and begins to cut
each blade individually. Miscommunication has occurred, so Thomas
explains to Jacques that by "cut the grass" he meant for Jacques to use a
lawn mower to cut the grass in his yard. Thomas, given the ubiquity of
the phrase "cut the grass" in our linguistic practice, used the phrase
without articulating the phrase's meaning. Only in light of the
miscommunication did Thomas articulate the phrase's meaning. He drew
that meaning from the phrase's conventional use. A similar
phenomenon - unreflective use of language -frequently occurred at the
framing and ratification.
193. This quotation was reorganized from the top of page 313. Id. at 313.
194. Strang, supra note 22, at 181.
195. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 932 (1828).
196. Strang, supra note 22, at 210-37.
197. Id. at 182.
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This first form of abduced-principle originalism is important to
originalism's ability to surmount the challenge of change. It enables
originalists to articulate the constitutional text's original meaning.
Without it, originalists would be left with repeated uses of a term or
phrase and nothing more, no legal norm that could apply to new
circumstances.' g Originalists would have phrases like Episcopal Church,
Congregationalist Church, Roman Catholic Church, Jewish synagogue,
but that would be all. With it, originalists can articulate the text's original
meaning and apply the norm embodied in that original meaning to new
circumstances. The originalist judge would apply the norm defining
"Religion" to, for instance, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, which did not exist when the First Amendment was ratified.
4. Abduced-Principle Originalism Based on Archetypal Practices
a. Introduction
From my own research, and from my review of originalist
scholarship along with originalist Supreme Court opinions, I believe that
there was, in some situations, no linguistic practice sufficiently
determinate to say that a provision had a coherent original meaning,
much less that it formed a legal norm.' Instead, the historical record
indicated that the Framers and Ratifiers understood the provision to
require, authorize, or proscribe a discrete (set of) practice(s). It is these
practices, these "data points," that form the basis for articulating an
abduced legal norm.
For example, assume that when the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause was ratified, there was no societal consensus
on the meaning of "cruel." Instead, the Framers and Ratifiers, and the
public more generally, understood that there were five punishments that
the Clause proscribed as "cruel," and five more that the Clause
permitted. These practices were the archetypal practices2° that the
Framers and Ratifiers understood the Clause to proscribe and permit.
Stated differently, when asked the meaning of the Clause, the Framers
and Ratifiers would have explained that the Clause proscribed and
permitted those specific practices. The Clause prohibited, for instance,
the federal government from breaking criminals on the wheel, 20 ' but it
permitted the government to employ the death penalty.0" Beyond these
198. See FALLON, JR., supra note 3, at 42 (explaining the necessity of norms to implement
constitutional meaning).
199. See Brewer, supra note 178, at 994 ("[D]isagreement among a group of [language] users of the
same term ... occasions uncertainty among the group taken as a whole.").
200. Jed Rubenfeld has articulated something similar, the paradigm case. RUBENFELD, supra note
71, at 180-95.
205. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,446-47 (89o).
202. The Constitution recognized the licitness of the death penalty. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. In fact,
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ten points of consensus, however, there was no broader consensus on the
term's meaning; there simply was no coherent original meaning. The data
from which the originalist must articulate" the term's original meaning
are these archetypal practices.
This graph illustrates the process by which abduced-principle
originalism operates.
I I
Application of Abduced-Principle [..._ - - - -L T.....
I Gaps Between Practices Archetypal Practices
Extension of Abduced-Principle to New Situations
Abduced-principle originalism starts by identifying a constitutional
text for which there was no coherent original meaning, but regarding
which there was a public consensus on what practices-archetypal
practices-the text acted upon. Then, one must abduce a rule, standard,
or principle that fits the identified archetypal practices. Next, one applies
this abduced norm to a situation not covered by the archetypal practices.
Other originalists have similarly recognized that the Constitution's
original meaning "runs out." Both Keith Whittington and Randy
Barnett, following earlier scholars, 4 have adopted a distinction between
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction."
Constitutional interpretation is the explication of the Constitution's
original meaning.2° Constitutional construction, by contrast, occurs when
Sir William Blackstone bemoaned the wide range of crimes for which death was the prescribed
punishment. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *19.
203. Although I was initially inclined to use the term "construct" to describe the activity in this
sentence, because of its usage by Whittington and Barnett to designate creative activity, I employed
another term that does not necessarily indicate creativity.
204. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This
Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REv. 1177, 1264-76 (1987) (distinguishing "extraconstitutional" from
"contraconstitutional" interpretations).
2o5. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 118-3o (explaining constitutional construction and how it differs
from interpretation); WHITrINGTON, supra note 1O, at 5-14 (same).
206. WHITTINGTON, supra note 1o, at 5.
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the Constitution's original meaning is underdetermined and there is
choice regarding how to construct the Constitution's meaning."°
Barnett, Whittington, and others have not, however, addressed the
possibility of abduced-principle originalism. Abduced-principle
originalism can increase the relative coverage of the original meaning,
and thereby decrease the relative need for construction. It does so by
filling in the gaps between and beyond archetypal practices. Abduced-
principle originalism will not eliminate the need for construction which,
as discussed below, is itself one of the tools that originalism possesses to
meet the challenge of change.
b. Theoretical and Practical Possibilities of No Original
Meaning, and the Limits of Abduced-Principle Originalism
Before proceeding to further describe this second type of abduced-
principle originalism, a short note on its existence and limits.
Theoretically, since language is primarily the use of agreed-upon symbols
to communicate meaning,"' a failure to agree upon the meaning of
symbols used to communicate may lead to a failure to communicate. In
the context of constitutional interpretation and originalism, the failure of
contemporaries to agree on the meaning of the terms used in the
Constitution-the lack of consensus-will lead to a lack of original
meaning.
It is theoretically possible that the Framers and Ratifiers failed to
agree on the meaning of (portions of) the Constitution's text. For
instance, the Framers and Ratifiers may have used a phrase for which
there was no widespread conventional meaning."c This theoretical
possibility shows the abstract need for some interpretative tool, like
abduced-principle originalism, to address how originalism operates in
these areas that lack agreement. In fact, one of the common and
powerful criticisms of originalism is that it relies on linguistic consensus
when none is there. °
Further, as a practical matter, linguistic communication regularly
fails, and there are instances where it appears that there was relatively
little consensus on the Constitution's meaning. For example, there was a
strong consensus that the Free Speech Clause2"' prohibited prior
207. Id.
2o8. See WHrrrNGTON, supra note iO, at 59 ("Wittgenstein's analysis of the impossibility of a
private language elucidates.., the fact that language is essentially communicative.").
209. As I discuss below, the Equal Protection Clause may be an example of this. See infra Part IV.
210. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at go (detailing some of these criticisms); Richard S. Kay,
American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 35 (Larry Alexander
ed., 1998) (responding to these criticisms from an original intent perspective).
211. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I, cl. 2
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restraints on speech."2 There are many other aspects of the Clause,
however, for which there was likely no consensus.1 3 Perhaps the most
prominent example was whether the Clause protected truth as a defense
to allegations of seditious libel." 4
It is not possible to identify specific portions of the Constitution's
text for which there was no, or no significant, original meaning without
significant historical research, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
The theoretical possibility of no linguistic agreement, coupled with the
everyday failure of language to communicate, and the preliminary
evidence that at least some provisions did not have a coherent original
meaning, shows the need for abduced-principle originalism.
It is more likely that there will not be a coherent original meaning if
one or more of the following circumstances are present. If, when the
constitutional text was drafted and ratified, the subject matter of the text
was contested, it is more likely that there would not have been a
coherent original meaning. Also, if the text used terms that involved
substantial value choices, then agreement was less likely. Similarly, if the
subject matter was relatively new, such that no societal consensus had
developed around it, it is less likely that there was a coherent original
meaning. Another circumstance is if the text utilized words in a
nonstandard manner."5 Lastly, the text in question may, in fact, have
been a capacious term intentionally chosen to cover and avoid resolving
conflict over the text's subject matter.2' 6 The theme running through
these factors, and others, is the high possibility of dispute among
contemporaries regarding the text's subject matter.
212. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 188o
(reprint ed. Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1851) ("It is plain, then, that the language of this
amendment imports no more, than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his
opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always, that he does not injure
any other person in his rights."); Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and
Press, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 85-86 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., i99i) [hereinafter THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (stating that the conventional meaning of the
Free Speech Clause was that it adopted the common law which prohibited prior restraints).
213. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 120 (1999) ("At the time of the
drafting and ratification of the First Amendment, few among them clearly understood what they
meant by the free press clause.").
214. See LEVY, supra note 213, at 86-88 (arguing that there are some indications that the Clause
outlawed libel); id. at 120 ("Considerable disagreement existed ... on the question of whether
freedom of expression meant the right to print the truth about government measures and officials if
the truth was defamatory."); STORY, supra note 212, § 993 (stating that the First Amendment
"expand[ed]" on the common law by protecting the right to "publish what is true").
215. A clear instance of this is Article III's grant of federal court jurisdiction over nonconsenting
states sued by citizens of another state. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 5.
26. The Contracts Clause may be an example of this. U.S. CONST. art. I, § io, cl. i.
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Abduced-principle originalism operates only when there is no
linguistic practice sufficiently determinate to support a determinate
original meaning of a constitutional text. When there is determinate
original meaning, it governs. Abduced-principle originalism does not
operate when there is determinate original meaning because, as
described below, that original meaning is the authoritative form in which
the Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions were communicated. Abduced-principle originalism, by
contrast, is a means of ascertaining as closely as possible the Framers'
and Ratifiers' authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions when
there is no original meaning available to consult.
Abduced-principle originalism requires interpreters, often judges, to
engage in a historical inquiry. They must ascertain the archetypal
practices that the text in question was understood to permit, prohibit, or
require. To the extent these are difficult historical questions, abduced-
principle originalism will challenge the ability of judges and others to
correctly ascertain the archetypal practices. These challenges, however,
are no greater than those posed by originalism generally. Therefore, the
extent to which one is persuaded by originalist claims that originalism is a
viable enterprise despite these challenges, " will largely determine one's
view of abduced-principle originalism's practical viability.
c. Abduced-Principle Originalism Is Originalist
The core of originalism is that the Constitution's original meaning is
its authoritative meaning."' Despite the numerous and not necessarily
compatible justifications given by originalists, this core remains.
Abduced-principle originalism, as a mechanism for ascertaining the
constitutional text's original meaning, preserves this core. Consequently,
abduced-principle originalism is likely compatible with these different
originalist justifications.
I have described elsewhere the justification for originalism that I
believe is the most powerful: the concept of the common good."9
Abduced-principle originalism fits with, and flows from, originalism
rooted in the concept of the common good.2" Next, I briefly explain why
217. See Kay, supra note 210, at 228-29 (responding to these claims).
218. See DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM II
(2oo5) (stating that originalists claim that "the original understanding of the constitutional text always
trumps any contrary understanding of that text"); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note I, at 2-8
(describing the fixation and contribution theses of originalism).
219. See Strang, supra note 24 (articulating this argument in greater depth).
220. For short explanations of the common good, see id. at 983-87, and Lee J. Strang, The Role of
the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 55 (2oo5). For
an in-depth review of the concept, see generally V. Bradley Lewis, The Common Good in Classical
Political Philosophy. 25 CURRENT ISSUES CATH. HIGHER EDUC. 25 (2oo6).
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the common good requires original meaning interpretation of the United
States Constitution and how abduced-principle originalism follows from
that justification.2 '
The Constitution's original meaning is authoritative because it is the
method of interpretation that best effectuates the Framers' and Ratifiers'
(I) authoritative, (2) prudential, and (3) social-ordering decisions. Every
community must make authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions to enable the community to pursue the common good
effectively-to overcome coordination problems."'
A decision is authoritative if it is made by the person or body with
authority to make binding decisions for the community. For example,
Ohio's state legislature is recognized by Ohioans as having the authority
to make legal determinations for the state. Ohioans appreciate that
speed limit laws passed by the state's legislature are authoritative for that
reason.
A decision is prudential when there is no one uniquely or
demonstrably right answer to a question of conduct, so an authoritative
person or institution must use prudential judgment to choose the best
answer, all things considered. For example, the question of the proper
speed limit on highways has no uniquely correct answer. The legislature
or administrative agency making a speed limit determination will use its
prudential judgment, weigh the numerous factors that go into the
determination- safety, environmental concerns, efficiency, to name a
few-and make a decision.
Lastly, a decision is social ordering if it is intended to and
coordinates the actions of members of a community. Returning to the
speed limit context, legislative or administrative determinations
regarding speed limits do, in fact, coordinate the actions of citizens of
Ohio.
Authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions are binding on
members of a society because they enable members of the society to
pursue their own happiness by overcoming coordination problems.23 For
instance, speed limits are binding because they permit Ohioans to use
highways reasonably effectively, and use of highways is necessary to
221. This account is somewhat modified from my earlier account, given in Strang, supra note 24.
While I believe that the account I offered in Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition is accurate, I
believe that the account I articulate here is a related, additional, and possibly more powerful, reason in
support of originalism. It is possibly more powerful, I believe, because it does not rely on the contested
historical claim that our society, between 1787 and 1789, adopted original meaning originalism as an
authoritative interpretative convention.
222. FINNIS, supra note 34, at 155, 231-32.
223. Id. at 125, 154-56, 231-33,335.
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human flourishing224 and would not be possible, or at least not as
effectively so, absent a speed limit coordinating usage of highways.
Ohioans, to properly understand the substance of the legislature's
speed limit decision, will look to the original meaning of the statute in
which the legislature placed Ohio's speed limit. Ohioans will use the
statute's text, structure, historical context, and other information relevant
to ascertaining the meaning the legislature intended to convey to them.
Ohioans' goal is to accurately understand the legislature's authoritative,
prudential, social-ordering decision on speed limits.
Turning to constitutional interpretation, the Constitution embodies
numerous authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions that have
permitted our society to pursue the common good in a reasonably
effective manner. We respect the Constitution's -and the Framers' and
Ratifiers' - authority when we respect its pursuit of the common good.
This requires following its original meaning because the Constitution's
original meaning is the meaning that the Framers and Ratifiers used
when putting their authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions
into words -directions -for our society."' The Constitution's original
meaning is the meaning that enables the Framers and Ratifiers to
communicate their decisions to us, and for Americans to coordinate their
actions in accord with those decisions.
First, the Framers and Ratifiers, when engaged in the process of
creating and approving the Constitution, possessed the authority to make
authoritative decisions for our national society's pursuit of the common
good."6 The Constitution was recognized as authoritative because of its
origin in the authoritative process of ratification."7 The Constitution was
recognized as authoritative when and because it was ratified in state
conventions." '8 The same remains true today,229 although some of our
legal practices diverge. 3'
224. This is true at least in our society as it is presently structured.
225. See Strang, supra note 24, at 97o-8I (surveying the literature supporting this point); see also
BARNETT, supra note 8, at 89-117 (arguing that the Framers and Ratifiers understood that the
Constitution's original meaning was authoritative); WHITnNGTON, supra note 8, at I8o (same).
226. AMAR, supra note 58, at 6-21; JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 190-95; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUTIoN 110-12 (1996).
227. See ELY, supra note 71, at 6 ("It is also instructive that once the Constitution was ratified
virtually everyone in America accepted it immediately as the document controlling his destiny.").
228. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 8, at 146 ("The astonishing acquiescence of the anti-Federalists
to the result of constitutional ratification could only come from their acceptance of the Constitution
itself.... The fact that [opponents of the Constitution accepted the ratification] is indicative of their
acceptance of the Constitution as written as the authoritative expression of the popular will, binding
themselves as well as their opponents."); see also 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
372, 374 (James Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 191 i) ("As the [Constitution] came from [the Framers] it
was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were
breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State Conventions.").
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Second, the Framers' and Ratifiers' decisions on how to pursue the
national common good most effectively, embodied in the Constitution's
text, were prudential because there were no uniquely correct answers to
many of the questions they faced. Instead, the Framers and Ratifiers had
to use their best judgment, in light of all the circumstances."' For
example, there is no uniquely correct answer to the question of how
many branches the federal government should have or to the question of
how old the President must be to serve. But they are questions that must
be answered.
Third, the Framers' and Ratifiers' decisions, embodied in the
Constitution, were also social ordering because they overcame the
coordination problems that had plagued the Articles of Confederation by
coordinating the activities of Americans. This enabled Americans to
pursue their basic human goods reasonably effectively. 32 For example,
one of the problems that plagued the Articles of Confederation national
government was its inability to regulate interstate commerce. States
began to erect trade barriers to capture for themselves as much valuable
commercial trade as possible.233 The Commerce Clause had, as one of its
chief objects, the elimination of state trade barriers.234 Enforcement of
229. This is evidenced by, for instance, the Supreme Court's constant refrain that, even in its most
controversial decisions, it is interpreting the Constitution. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 442 (2000) ("[T]he Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution...."); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) ("The underlying substance of [the Court's]
legitimacy is of course the warrant for the Court's decisions in the Constitution."). The document in
the National Archives is identified as the document signed by the Framers and approved by the
Ratifiers. See Charters of Freedom-The Declaration of Independence, The Constitution, The Bill of
Rights, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/chartersof _freedom_6.html (last visited May 17,
2009) (stating that the document contained in the glass case in the Archives' rotunda was the "signed
[and] engrossed parchment" from the framing Convention).
230. On exceedingly rare occasion the Court has acknowledged that a decision or line of cases was,
at best, only tenuously connected to the Constitution. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. t86, 19t
(1986) ("Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have little or no textual support in the
constitutional language."), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Some scholars have
attempted to show that these divergent practices are legitimate. See FALLON, JR., supra note 3, at I I I-
26 (arguing that we have an unwritten constitution that is authoritative in a manner similar to the
written Constitution, but not to the same extent).
231. See GEORGE, supra note 53, at Io8-II (discussing the concept of determinatio from the
Aristotelian tradition, which is the process legislators go through, using their prudential judgment, to
make the natural law determinate through positive law norms).
232. By basic human goods, I mean the analytically divisible portions of human flourishing.
233. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1904) ("The
interfering and un-neighborly regulations of some states, contrary to the true spirit of the union, have,
in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others.").
234. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (10976) ("The Clause was designed in
part to prevent trade barriers that had undermined efforts of the fledgling States to form a cohesive
whole following their victory in the Revolution.").
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the Commerce Clause has led to a prosperous national commercial
market. 35
Lastly, tying the pursuit of the common good to the Constitution's
original meaning, the Framers and Ratifiers communicated their
decisions via the Constitution's original meaning. 36 The Constitution's
original meaning is, therefore, authoritative, because it is the form within
which the Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative decisions were and are
communicated to members of our society, enabling Americans to pursue
their own and the common good reasonably effectively. As James
Madison affirmed, "I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation.
In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.
2 37
Abduced-principle originalism flows from my grounding of
originalism in the concept of the common good. For those discrete
practices regarding which there was an original meaning, it is respected
by abduced-principle originalism. In other words, where the Framers and
Ratifiers made an authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decision, it is
respected.
The phenomenon of archetypal practices occurs generally when
legislators have in mind a discrete set of problems that legislation is
meant to rectify. An example from the statutory context is the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890,238 whose primary purpose was to eliminate
corporate trusts such as the Standard Oil Trust.239 However, the text
employed by the legislators, for one reason or another, does not have a
coherent original meaning, and consequently fails to communicate a
usable legal norm. The Sherman Antitrust Act is a good example
because the original meaning of section i was (and remains) unclear. 4
We do know that section i was intended or understood to outlaw
corporate trusts."' By ensuring that any interpretation of section i
outlaws corporate trusts, interpreters respect Congress' authoritative,
235. Cf Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,539 (1949).
236. See Strang, supra note 24, at 97o-8I (surveying the literature supporting this point); see also
BARNETT, supra note 8, at 89-117 (arguing that the Framers and Ratifiers understood that the
Constitution's original meaning was authoritative); WHrrIINGTON, supra note 8, at 18o (same).
237. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 190, 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., i9io).
238. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (189o) (codified as amended at i5 U.S.C. §§ I-7 (2006)).
239. See HoRwrrz, supra note 35, at 8o ("The 'trust problem' therefore became a central issue of
public policy only a few years before the Sherman Act was enacted in 189o.").
240. PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATON 1O6, at 14 (1978) ("Neither the language nor the legislative
history... is very illuminating about what specifically is allowed or prohibited.").
241. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 103C2, at 53 (3d ed. 2006).
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prudential, social-ordering decision to the extent there was a decision. In
the same way, application of abduced-principle originalism respects the
Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions.242
In the constitutional context, there are many instances where
scholars, including original meaning originalists who purport to eschew
resort to Framer and Ratifier intent, resort to the archetypal practices
that the text governed. For instance, the Seventeenth Amendment
provides that the "Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years."243
Reading only the conventional meaning of the Amendment's text, one
would conclude that popular election of senators would last for only six
years." The Amendment's primary purpose-that is, the archetypal
practice the Amendment's framers and ratifiers intended to prescribe-
was to require permanent direct election of senators. The fact that no
one interprets the Seventeenth Amendment as a six-year experiment
shows that archetypal practices and legislator intent play a role in
establishing the Amendment's meaning.
Larry Alexander has argued similarly. Law, for Alexander, is "the
determinations of authorities of what ought to be done.""24 Authorities
make legal determinations to resolve coordination problems and to make
242. When there is a coherent original meaning of a text, it will almost always fit the archetypal
situations that the text's original meaning permitted, proscribed, or required. Of course, it is possible
for the Framers and Ratifiers of the text to have been mistaken, and hence to have believed that the
text in question proscribed what was permitted, permitted what was proscribed, or other variations.
Many originalists make the claim that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause were mistaken in believing that the Clause permitted racially segregated public
schools when, in fact, it proscribed such schools. See, e.g., Green, supra note 9, at 597, 6o8 (noting that,
for example, the segregation of the District of Columbia's schools by Congress may be evidence of
"cognitive dissonance").
When that coherent original meaning meets new factual circumstances, its application to
those new situations cannot, I tentatively think, alter the status of the archetypal situations. It cannot,
for example, permit what was archetypally prohibited. This is because, as described above, respecting
the Framers' and Ratifiers' authority to resolve our society's coordination problems requires that
subsequent interpreters respect their prudential, social-ordering decisions. These decisions were
embodied in constitutional text, which is itself the vehicle through which the Framers and Ratifiers
communicated their decisions to members of society who, in turn, were obligated to coordinate their
activity in accord with those decisions. Archetypal situations were the situations that the Framers and
Ratifiers understood the constitutional text to permit, prohibit, or require specific action by members
of society to overcome the coordination problem that existed in the archetypal situation.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
244. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, "Is that English You're Speaking?" Why Intention
Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 967, 981 (2004) (using the Seventeenth
Amendment to make the same point).
245. Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of
Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 359 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
1995).
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moral requirements conventional,46  and then they put those
determinations into legal texts to communicate their determinations to
those governed by the authorities.247 Hence, the goal of interpretation is
to gather the authorities' meaning that they attempted to communicate
through the legal text.""
Authorities will have, according to Alexander, intentions at multiple
levels of generality."9 Interpreters, however, may not "disregard more
specific intentions in favour of more general ones" because, to do so,
would "convert the interpreter into the legal authority.""25 Since legal
authorities are established to make determinations, and authorities will
always have multiple levels of intention that later interpreters could use
to effectively reverse the authorities' specific intentions, doing so would
undermine the purpose of authorities in the first instance. 5' All
authoritative determinations-if interpreters could use the authorities'
general intentions to trump their specific intentions-would be subject to
revision, making the authorities' authoritative determinations illusory.
Likewise, any originalist abduced-principle must fit the Framers' and
Ratifiers' archetypal examples and cannot eliminate their authoritative,
prudential, social-ordering decision(s).
For instance, the Framers and Ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment
likely understood the Fourth Amendment to give special protection to
the home. 5  The home, for a host of reasons, had a unique status. 53
Accordingly, the Framers and Ratifiers determined that houses should
be protected in a unique manner from governmental intrusion. To search
a home, government agents would have to meet a high(er) threshold of
cause to satisfy the Amendment's reasonableness requirement.254
246. Id. at 360.
247. Id. at 36o-6i.
248. Id. at 361.
249. Id. at 388-89.
250. Id. at 390.
251. Id.
252. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see AMAR, supra note 58, at 65-67 (noting the tremendous influence
on the Fourth Amendment by the English Wilkes v. Wood case, which involved government searching
Wilkes' house in retribution for his criticism of the crown); id. at 67 (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment singles out homes for special protection); LEVY, supra note 213, at 151 (finding that the
Fourth Amendment "emerged," in part, from the "'a man's house is his castle' belief of the Framers
and Ratifiers).
253. See AMAR, supra note 58, at 67 ("Again, we must note that the amendment singles out
'houses' for special mention above and beyond other buildings subsumed within the catchall word
effects."(emphasis omitted)); LEVY, supra note 213, at 151, 166 (describing the rhetorical tradition that
sought to give protection of home pride-of-place); id. at 154-56 (stating that the Fourth Amendment
was a response and rejection of early colonial abuse of general warrants); id. at 155-56 (explaining a
Massachusetts antecedent to the Fourth Amendment that was itself an attempt to eliminate some of
the abuses of general warrants).
254. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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When the Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791, this special
protection of the home fit well with the Amendment's broader original
meaning. The Amendment proscribed unreasonable "searches." '255
Searches, in 1791, meant physical intrusion, a common law trespass.26
The only means for a government official to search a home in 1791 was
to commit a (physical) trespass on the target's property. 57
How should an originalist Court rule when information regarding
the interior of a house, which government officials could previously have
obtained only via physical invasion, becomes available without trespass
because of advances in technology? The Supreme Court faced this
question in Kyllo v. United States.' The Court relying, in part, on the
special "Fourth Amendment[] protection of the home,"5 9 and tying its
conclusion to the Amendment's original meaning,6 ruled that a search
had occurred, 6' The Court, so ruling, preserved one of the Amendment's
archetypal cases.
I have argued that archetypal practices are protected under
abduced-principle originalism, and that this protection follows from my
grounding of originalism in the common good. In addition, the abduced
norms derived through abduced-principle originalism also respect the
Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions. The close fit between the abduced norm and the archetypal
practices ensures that the abduced norm will advance the common good
in a manner consistent with the Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative,
prudential, social-ordering decisions.
The abduced norm is also the Framers' and Ratifiers' norm because
it is the norm that a reasonable Framer or Ratifier would claim if asked
to articulate his reasoning behind his decisions. A reasonable Framer or
Ratifier would ask what-up to that point inchoate-norm fits the
archetypal practices the text prohibits, permits, or requires. By bringing
forward and making explicit the inchoate norm that fits the practices
identified by the Framers and Ratifiers, the process of abduced-principle
255. Id.
256. See AMAR, supra note 58, at 69 (noting that the Fourth Amendment was enforced by the
target's bringing a suit for damages against the government official(s) under trespass); Bradford P.
Wilson, The Fourth Amendment as More than a Form of Words: The View from the Founding, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 212, 15, 156-57 (same); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
466 (1928) (ruling that the Fourth Amendment forbids only "actual physical invasion of his house 'or
curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure"), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
257. AMAR, supra note 58, at 69.
258. 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2ooi).
259. Id. at 37.
260. Id. at 40.
261. Id.
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originalism mirrors the process utilized by the Framers and Ratifiers
themselves. Lawmakers, when articulating a norm to achieve their
desired objects, attempt to articulate a norm that fits the practices the
262lawmakers wish to proscribe, permit, or require.
If, utilizing the process of abduced-principle originalism, an
interpreter finds that more than one norm adequately fits the archetypal
practices, the interpreter must then situate himself in the position of the
Framers and Ratifiers. The interpreter should understand the Framers'
and Ratifiers' goals, knowledge, and the background circumstances
against which they worked. With this in mind, the interpreter must then
choose the norm the Framers and Ratifiers would have chosen. The
process of abduced-principle originalism articulates norms that are the
Framers' and Ratifiers'. The culmination of this process effectuates, as
much as possible, the Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative, prudential,
social-ordering decisions.
Judges utilizing abduced-principle originalism should, if more than
one norm adequately fits the archetypal practices, choose the norm that,
as best one can tell, the Framers and Ratifiers would have chosen. Judges
cannot choose the morally best norm when that norm is not the one that
the Framers and Ratifiers would have chosen. This limitation follows
from my justification for originalism in the common good.
If judges could choose the morally best norm, or the most abstract or
general norm, then they would effectively become the authority
promulgating authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions. This
undermines the efficacy of the initial coordination performed by the
Framers and Ratifiers," violates the norms governing judicial office
24
and, potentially worse, makes the substantive attractiveness of the norms
promulgated by judges choosing the morally best norm contingent on the
judges' ability to plausibly argue that their interpretation is a faithful
interpretation of the constitutional text.265
One last note before proceeding. The requirements for
appropriately utilizing abduced-principle originalism are relatively
robust. One must ascertain the lack of a coherent original meaning for
262. See AQUINAS, supra note 54, pt. I-I, Q. 93, art. I (stating that legislators, prior to legislating,
have in their mind "the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject
to his government"); see also Strang, supra note 220, at 55-56 (elaborating on the process of legislation
within the Aristotelian tradition).
263. See Alexander, supra note 245, at 390.
264. At least in our society regarding constitutional judicial review. See Strang, supra note 24, at
992-97 (making this argument). Other societies, and our own when judges act in their common law
capacity, permit-in fact, require-judges to issue authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions.
265. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. Rev. 104, 1x5 (1989) ("The
interpretations rendered and the results reached by presentist judges will turn ... less on mind-on
conscious human thought expressed through actual decisions-than on historical accident.").
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the constitutional text in question. One must also determine the
archetypal practices for the text, and then abduce a norm to fit those
practices. Lastly, if necessary, one must acquire the knowledge required
to situate oneself in the position of the Framers and Ratifiers to choose
the abduced norm that the Framers and Ratifiers would have chosen.
Each of these steps requires substantial skill, effort, and judgment.
d. Meeting the "Challenge of Change"
Regarding those provisions for which there was not a coherent
original meaning, other than the social consensus on the discrete
practices affected (or not affected) by the provisions, the originalist
interpreter has three possible responses: (i) restrict the provision's
authoritative meaning to that discrete set of practices regarding which
there was a consensus; (2) abduce the rule, standard, or principle that
best fits and justifies the discrete set of practices; or (3) determine which
rule, standard, or principle best fits and justifies the provision's text?
66
The originalist's correct response is, I will show below, option two:
inducing the norm that best fits and justifies the archetypal practices that
the constitutional provision in question was understood to require,
authorize, or forbid.
Option two is the correct originalist response, first, because the
resultant meaning of the provision-in the form of a rule, standard, or
principle-is the Constitution's original meaning. By ensuring that the
original meaning that does exist is retained, abduced-principle
originalism respects the authority of the Framers and Ratifiers to make
the prudential, social-ordering decisions which are embodied in the
Constitution. Additionally, the norms articulated using abduced-
principle originalism likewise respect the Framers' and Ratifiers'
authority. Second, while option one does respect the Framers and
Ratifiers' authority, option two ensures that originalism can surmount
the challenge of change, unlike option one. Third, while option three can
meet the challenge of change, it does not, like option two, respect the
Framers' and Ratifiers' authority. Fourth, option two, unlike the first and
third options, fits with how we use language.
Abduced-principle originalism permits originalism to avoid the
problematic first option: limiting the Constitution's original meaning to
the archetypal practices. If it were otherwise, then the problem of change
would be acute. The Constitution's original meaning would be limited to
the circumstances at the time of ratification. Since the discrete set of
practices would not change - and most importantly, would not expand to
include new practices-the Constitution's original meaning would
266. I intend option three to represent Ronald Dworkin's semantic originalism.
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quickly become outdated. It would be limited to the archetypal cases
existing at the time of ratification.
Assume, for instance, that the original meaning of cruel in the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause ' 6 did not create a rule, standard, or
principle. Instead, assume that the historical evidence showed that the
public understanding of the Clause was that only five discrete practices
were prohibited by the Clause. Given government's ability to devise new
punishments, the efficacy of the Clause would be greatly undermined if
the Clause's original meaning could not reach new punishments because
it was limited to the then-existing five practices.
Abduced-principle originalism prevents this from occurring. The
interpreter would abduce a rule, standard, or principle that fits the
practices regarding which there was an original meaning. Abduced-
principle originalism would, like the principled originalism I described
above, be able to apply the abduced norm to new and unforeseen
circumstances. This would include new punishments that were proscribed
by the abduced norm of "cruel."
Abduced-principle originalism results, as a practical matter, in less of
a role for constitutional construction. This occurs because, prior to the
abduction of a norm, the only area of determinate original meaning -the
only role for interpretation -is that covered by the archetypal practices.
After abduction, by contrast, the abduced norm governs substantially
more area of social life, thereby determining the outcome of more cases
than was the situation previously.
e. Respecting the Constitution's Authority
Abduced-principle originalism is better than option three because it,
unlike option three, respects the Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative
decisions. 68 As I discussed earlier in the context of Ronald Dworkin's
semantic originalism, constitutional text is the means utilized by the
Framers and Ratifiers to communicate their authoritative, prudential,
social-ordering decisions. The original meaning of the text best
effectuates that communication 69 This meaning may be, as an empirical
matter, identical to the morally best conception of the text, but there is
no necessary identity. Instead, ascertaining the Constitution's original
267. U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII.
268. See supra Part III.C.4.c.
269. In a future article I hope to argue that the Constitution's original meaning usually best
effectuates communication from the Framers and Ratifiers to those governed by the Constitution.
There are, I believe, occasions when interpreters have access to the Framers' and Ratifiers' intended
meaning, including situations when their intended meaning deviates from the original meaning. I plan
to argue that in those situations where we have access to the original intent, and when that intended
meaning deviates from the original meaning, the Constitution's originally intended meaning is
authoritative.
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meaning is a historical enterprise. The more accurately an interpreter
engages in that enterprise, the more effectively the Constitution conveys
the Framers' and Ratifiers' meaning, and the better the Framers' and
Ratifiers' authoritative decisions are respected.
Imagine, for instance, that a father is coaching his son's basketball
teamY.70 Assume further that the son is throwing elbows, swearing, and
pushing members of the opposing team. The father yells to the son, "Play
fair!" Is the father instructing the son to use his, the son's, best judgment
of what "fair" is, and then abide by that conception of fair? Or, is the
father instructing the son to stop throwing elbows, swearing, and
pushing-that is, utilize the father's own conception of "fair"?
One answers the question of the meaning of the father's instruction
using a historical inquiry. One must look at the context of the father's
statement to try and ascertain the father's meaning. One does not, as
Dworkin prescribes, engage in a theoretical inquiry into the morally best
meaning of the term "fair." Instead, the goal of the inquiry is to
understand what the father was attempting to communicate to his son.
The father is analogous to a lawmaker, and he made an
authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decision for those in his charge,
including his son. This hypothetical is, therefore, analogous to the
Framers and Ratifiers communicating their decisions through the
Constitution. To ascertain the Constitution's meaning, an interpreter
must determine, as a matter of historical fact, the Constitution's original
meaning, and this will not necessarily be the text's morally best meaning.
Any identity between the morally best interpretation of
constitutional text and the text's original meaning is contingent.
Consequently, Dworkin's semantic originalism could regularly lead to a
meaning contrary to the Constitution's original meaning. When this
occurs, the Constitution does not effectively convey the Framers' and
Ratifiers' authoritative decisions, and their authority is not respected.
Returning to the basketball hypothetical, assume the son uses his
own conception of "fair," and that the son's conception is the morally
best meaning of "fair." The son then accurately applies that conception
and determines that it is fair to swear at opposing players. He is not
faithful to his father's instruction. Instead, he has undermined his father's
authority, as coach, to make authoritative decisions for the (common)
good of the team.
In all situations of which I am aware and, likely, in all possible
situations that could arise that call for application of abduced-principle
270. This hypothetical is modified from one used by Keith Whittington. See WHrINGTON, supra
note io, at 206-07.
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originalism, the abduced norm will be one that plausibly fits the text.
Stated differently, the resulting abduced norm would be a plausible
candidate for the text's original meaning even though there was not a
sufficient linguistic consensus to make the abduced norm the original
meaning.
It is theoretically possible, though not likely, for the resulting
abduced norm to not be a plausible interpretation of the text in question.
This is because the Framers and Ratifiers, who created and adopted the
constitutional text to communicate authoritative, prudential, social-
ordering decisions, were well-versed in the art of legislation and
meticulous in crafting the Constitution's text.
If the theoretical occurred, however, and the abduced norm is not a
plausible interpretation of the Constitution's text, respect for the
Framers' and Ratifiers' authoritative decisions requires following the
abduced norm despite is poor fit with the text.
For example, assume there were ten archetypal practices and that
the abduced norm fit all ten of them, but the norm was not a plausible
interpretation of the constitutional text. 7' Assume further that a
plausible interpretation of the text could account for nine of the
archetypal practices. In this situation, respecting the Framers' and
Ratifiers' authority requires including all ten practices. 72 The fact that
they miscommunicated - that no plausible interpretation of the
constitutional text includes all ten archetypal practices-is just that, a
mistake. Mistakes in communication occur in law and in life. My
grounding of originalism in the concept of the common good requires
interpreters to advance the common good in the manner sought by the
Framers' and Ratifiers' even when the Framers and Ratifiers failed to
articulate that manner effectively in the Constitution's text.
f. Abduced-Principle Originalism Fits Our Use of Language
Abduced-principle originalism also fits with how we use language in
everyday life. Those of us with children have had our children ask us for
permission to attend events, often with friends. '73 As the children ask to
attend different events, parents make relatively off-the-cuff decisions and
respond accordingly. Rarely are they conscious of explicitly utilizing a
norm or set of factors in making the decisions (such as the child's age and
271. This hypothetical is drawn from one posed by Michael Rappaport.
272. Let me emphasize that this discussion involves a situation where there is no original meaning.
If there was a coherent original meaning, I tentatively think that the same result would obtain. Stated
differently, I think that even when there is a coherent original meaning, interpreters should follow a
contrary archetypal practice. See Strang, supra note 220, at 65 n.86 (raising the possibility of this
distinction).
273. This example is modified from one given in Larry Alexander. Constrained by Precedent, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1989).
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the nature of the event), even though they may have used an inchoate
norm or set of factors.
In these instances, parents are acting analogously to legislators
because they are issuing authoritative, prudential, social-ordering
decisions for their families. These decisions come packaged in relatively
basic form, simple yes's or no's. Our understanding of the meaning of
these decisions is limited to the discrete situations out of which the norm
arose.
After these requests, decisions, and answers have occurred a number
of times, assume further that a parent denied a child's request to attend
an event. The child protests that the parent "isn't fair." To know whether
the parent has been fair, the parent will have to determine what he has
been doing. The usual way to make that determination is to ask: what
norm best fits the discrete instances where the parent "legislated" in the
past?
In answering that determination, the parent would hypothesize
possible norms that might fit his past decisions. The parent might abduce,
for example, the principle that children may only attend edifying events
regarding which the children are sufficiently mature. This abduced-
principle would fit the time when the parent authorized the five year old
child to attend a church pageant with his teenage sister. It would also fit
the instance when the parent refused to let the ten year old child attend a
heavy metal rock concert with his school friends of the same age. And so
on.
This principle, since it is drawn from the discrete set of situations can
fairly be said to account for and represent those situations. The principle
therefore respects the authoritative, prudential, social-ordering decisions
of the parent qua legislator. The principle does not act in contravention
of the parent's authority to make decisions regarding the children's
attendance at events.
Similarly, abduced-principle originalism accounts for those discrete
practices regarding which there was a coherent original meaning, where
the text was understood to authorize, require, or prohibit certain
practices.274 Each of those practices is preserved by the abduced-
principle. As a result, the Framers' and Ratifiers' authority is respected.
Further, the parent can apply the abduced principle to new requests
by the children. Assume that the child who protested that the parent
"isn't fair" was seventeen, but the parent considered him relatively
immature, and the event was a class trip to Rome. This was a question
274. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 220 ("The intentions of the speaker are critical to
determining the textual referent, regardless of the reality of the concepts to which the speaker refers
or of the state of the speaker's knowledge.").
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the parent had never before faced. Although the trip is edifying, it is such
a large undertaking that the parent believed the child was not sufficiently
mature. By applying the same norm utilized previously in a principled
fashion, the parent can respond that he was, in fact, fair to the child.
g. Abduced-Principle Originalism Provides Determinate
Original Meaning
One could criticize abduced-principle originalism as unable, in
principle, to provide a determinate legal norm. One could argue that
there are an infinite (or at least a large) number of norms that an
interpreter could fit to the discrete practices for which there was an
original meaning. For example, the critic could argue that, if there were
archetypal practices A, B, C, D, and E, an infinite number of norms
could fit this set of practices. For example, norm X could include
practices A through E. Norm Y could include practices A through E plus
F. Norm Z could include A through F plus G, and so on. Stated
differently, any data set can be subsumed under different descriptions
because each description is slightly different."'
Abduced-principle originalism avoids this criticism by requiring an
interpreter to abduce that norm that most closely fits the discrete
practices for which there was a coherent original meaning. This solution,
first, fits the normative justification for originalism found in the concept
of the common good, and, second, meets the criticism laid out above.
Third, if, after exhausting the historical resources, an interpreter cannot
determine which norm best fits the historical data, the interpreter should
adopt that norm which a reasonable Framer and Ratifier would adopt if
given the choice.
First, in most, if not all situations, it is possible for an interpreter to
narrow down to one the norm that best fits the archetypal practices. This
is true for a number of reasons. Primary among them is the historical
accessibility of the Framers' and Ratifiers' context. This accessibility
allows later interpreters to both identify the archetypal practices
themselves and articulate a norm that, especially given the Framers' and
Ratifiers' goals, makes sense of the archetypal practices.
Second, using the norm that most closely fits the archetypal practices
flows from the normative justification for abduced-principle originalism.
Abduced-principle originalism is a mechanism to allow later interpreters
to broaden the reach of the Constitution's original meaning. But it does
not do so at the expense of the Framers' and Ratifiers' authority. The
Framers' and Ratifiers' prudential, social-ordering decisions regarding
which there was an original meaning-the archetypal practices that were
275. See WrIrrINGTON, supra note To, at 182 ("Both originalists and their critics have struggled
with the question of the relevant level of generality at which intentions should be understood.").
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prohibited, permitted, or required-remain authoritative because they
form the anchors of the abduced norm. Later interpreters thereby
contribute to the advancement of the common good by ensuring that
coordination problems authoritatively solved by the Framers and
Ratifiers are respected.
Third, perhaps most importantly, the abduced norm formed using
abduced-principle originalism is identifiably the Framers' and Ratifiers'.
As I described above, norms formulated using abduced-principle
originalism result from utilizing the Framers' and Ratifiers'
perspective.276 This permits an interpreter to tie an abduced norm as
closely to the Framers and Ratifiers as possible.
Of course, the methodology of abduced-principle originalism will
not eliminate disagreement and the need for judges to exercise their
practical and legal judgment. There are many points at which reasonable
interpreters could disagree. Disagreement could arise, for instance, over
whether a particular norm most closely fits the archetypal practices, or
whether the norm fits all of the archetypal practices. Interpreters could
also disagree over which practices are archetypal. While at one time
originalists justified originalism on the grounds that it constrained
judicial discretion, today originalists accept that originalism entails the
exercise of judicial discretion. 77
Other originalists, despite not having articulated the concept of
abduced-principle originalism, have utilized it in their historical research.
Christopher Green, for instance, has demonstrated the necessity of
abduced-principle originalism as part of his broader discussion of the
philosophy of language concepts of sense and reference."' Green argued
that the sense of constitutional text is fixed by the Framers and Ratifiers,
but that the referents of constitutional text can (and should) change in
response to changed social conditions.279 Green noted, however, that a
constitutional text's sense may not always be clear.28 In those situations,
Green stated that an interpreter must "work backward from original
reference to original sense by taking into account the original assessment
of facts." ,2i
276. See supra Part III.C.4.b.
277. See Strang, supra note 168, at 439 (describing the need for a theory of judicial virtue in
originalism).
278. Green, supra note 9, at 594-95.
279. Id. at 560.
280. Id. at 594-95.
281. Id. at 595; see also id. at 594 ("[Wje may have a puzzle about trying to work backward from
particular instances to the text in order to figure out what sense [the Framers] attached to their
language.").
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Stated differently, when the Constitution's original meaning is vague
or ambiguous, Green advises interpreters to abduce the legal norm that
fits the originally understood applications of the Constitutional text. As a
result, the sense-reference distinction, with its wide-ranging philosophical
acceptance, supports my claims regarding the plausibility of abduced-
principle originalism.
D. INDETERMINATE AND UNDERDETERMINATE ORIGINAL MEANING
Essential to originalism is this limitation: the Constitution's original
meaning is binding only to the extent that it is determinate.2 A norm is
determinate if it resolves the outcome of a case. A norm is
underdeterminate if it provides a range of outcomes that are consistent
with but not determined by the norm. A norm is indeterminate if it does
not limit the universe of possible outcomes in a case.2
s3
The scope of area governed by constitutional construction in
originalism is both a theoretical and empirical issue. On the theory side,
originalists diverge on whether and to what extent construction plays a
role in originalism.5 On the empirical side, it is a historical question
whether, in a given case and regarding a particular provision of the
Constitution, that text's original meaning is vague or ambiguous. This
Article is not the place to resolve these outstanding questions other than
to note that many prominent originalists have argued that the scope of
construction is broad.8 '
An instance of where the Constitution's original meaning is likely
underdetermined in the face of new technology is whether the
Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the Internet. Using
Barnett's statement of the Clause's original meaning as the basis of
inquiry," 6 it seems unclear whether the electrons crossing state lines on
the Internet,27 or perhaps the information conveyed by the packages of
electrons," constitute "trade or exchange of goods" or "the means of
transporting them.
'289
282. I review the literature on, and describe these concepts in, Strang, supra note 22o, at 49-54.
283. I do not address what qualifies as indeterminacy for purposes of originalism. For a discussion
of the difference between epistemological and metaphysical indeterminacy, see Ken Kress, A Preface
to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 134, 138 (i99o).
284. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note i, at 19-22 (detailing this divergence).
285. WHMTnNGTON, supra note Io, at 214; see also Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note i, at
75-79 (surveying different understandings of construction).
286. See BARNESrT, supra note 8, at 313 (describing the original meaning as being "to specify how a
rightful activity may be transacted... and the power to prohibit wrongful acts" in "the trade or
exchange of goods[,] including the means of transporting them ... between persons of one state and
another").
287. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982) (ruling that
Congress has the Commerce Clause authority to regulate electricity transmission and generation).
288. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (ruling that Congress has the
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In situations where the Constitution's original meaning is
determinate, there is no flexibility: the interpreter-the courts, the
President, or Congress-has no choice and must follow its mandate.2"
However, where the Constitution's original meaning is under- or
indeterminate, Congress has the authority to make constitutional
determinations, also labeled constitutional constructions.29 ' When
Congress is working within the underdeterminate constitutional text, it
may not violate the determinate original meaning that exists but, within
those strictures, Congress can be creative. In these situations, because
the original meaning is not completely (or even strongly) constraining, its
rootedness in the past is not an issue and, hence, the problem of change
is not an issue. Instead, Congress can use its prudential judgment to
address current issues in the manner it sees fit.
Returning to the example of the Commerce Clause regulating the
Internet: Congress has repeatedly passed statutes constructing its
authority under the Commerce Clause. 9 ' It has exercised authority to
regulate the Internet. Consequently, the underdetermined nature of the
Commerce Clause's original meaning has permitted Congress to
construct a response to changed technology.
Lastly, some scholars have suggested that much of constitutional
law-and much of the Supreme Court's case law-performs the function
of "implementing" the Constitution.93 According to these scholars, the
Court articulates rules, tests, and other doctrines of constitutional law
that bridge the gap between constitutional meaning and the facts of the
world."9 The Court uses implementing rules to implement both the
Constitution's original meaning and meaning constructed from the
Constitution's original meaning. An example of an implementing rule is
Commerce Clause authority to regulate broadcast communication).
289. See William Lynch, The Application of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of199o
to the Internet: Proper E-Planning Prevents Poor E-Performance, 12 COMMLAW CONSPEcruS 245, 256-
58 (2004) (noting that the question is an open one, and arguing that under the Court's broad
interpretation of the Clause, Congress can regulate the Internet); see also Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 177 (19o8) (summarizing the Supreme Court's then-contemporaneous understanding of the
Congress' Commerce Clause power as including the power to regulate "the transmission of messages
by telegraph"), overruled on other grounds by Phelphs Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 177
(1941).
290. Strang, supra note 24, at 982-ooi (offering three arguments why federal judges are bound by
the Constitution's determinate original meaning).
291. See Strang, supra note 220, at 70-72; see also WHrrNGTON, supra note 8, at 7-14 (arguing
similarly).
292. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (regulating online decency); id. § 231 (regulating online
pornography).
293. For likely the most prominent example of this, see FALLON, JR., supra note 3, at i-i i.
294. Id. at 5.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the purpose test from Washington v. Davis.295 There, the Supreme Court
required a plaintiff to show that a defendant state had purposefully
discriminated on the basis of race to plead a viable Equal Protection
Clause violation
96
Without committing myself to the existence and nature of
implementing norms that can diverge from the Constitution's original
meaning, it is clear that the Court could modify rules that implement
constitutional constructions, and in this way respond to changed social
conditions. It may also be the case-although this is a subject for a future
article-that the Court may alter implementing rules that implement the
Constitution's determinate original meaning. If this is true, the Court can
then mitigate the tension between original meaning and changed social
conditions by altering the rules implementing the original meaning.
E. ARTICLE I AND THE POLICE POWER
Article I of the Constitution grants to Congress all of the federal
government's legislative power."9 Correspondingly, state governments
have plenary legislative power except where specifically restricted by the
federal or state constitutions 9.2 This power is known as the police
power."9
In those many areas where the federal or state legislatures have
legislative authority, they can react to changed circumstances as their
judgments dictate. Keith Whittington has similarly commented that
"[t]he Constitution does more than specify rights and powers retained by
the people. It also delegates power from the people to their chosen
representatives in order to realize positive constitutional values."3" The
Framers and Ratifiers, in response to the recognized problem of
changing social conditions, deliberately chose to enable Congress to
address change.3"'
295. 426 U.S. 229, 229-30 (1976).
296. Id. at 239.
297. See U.S. CoNsr. art. i, § i.
298. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.1 (7th ed. 2004)
(describing this relationship); Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal
Thought: The Presumption in Favor of Liberty over Law and the Court over the Constitution, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1499, 1544-45 (2007) (noting the depth and breadth of this view).
299. For articles discussing the concept of the police power, see Christopher Supino, The Police
Power and "Public Use": Balancing the Public Interest Against Private Rights Through Principled
Constitutional Distinctions, ito W. VA. L. REV. 711, 711 (2oo8), and D. Benjamin Barros, The Police
Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 471-72 (2004).
300. WHITTINGTON, supra note to, at 207.
301. See Kay, supra note 2io, at 38 ("[The Framers and Ratifiers] were well aware of th[e reality of
change], but dealt with it by narrowing the degree to which government was constitutionalized. For
most public decision-making, flexibility was ensured by leaving the political departments to deal with
change, unconstrained by prior constitutional rule.").
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Given the continuing existence of legislative ability to respond to
changed conditions, we should not be surprised to find that there are
numerous instances where Congress or the states have legislated in
reaction to what was perceived as an inadequate original meaning. In the
Fourth Amendment context, for instance, the Supreme Court overruled
Olmstead v. United States3"2 in Katz v. United States. °0 The Katz Court
replaced the Olmstead Court's originalist reading of the Fourth
Amendment with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept.3"4
Congress, however, perceived Katz's level of protection against
wiretapping as inadequate, so it enacted Title III in 1968.5 A fortiori,
Congress expanded protection beyond the Fourth Amendment's original
meaning, and it did so using its legislative power.
Originalism, as an interpretative theory, accords federal and state
legislatures broad legislative authority compatible with the Constitution's
original meaning. This Article is not the place to make detailed claims
regarding the scope of this legislative power other than to note that,
particularly at the state level, under an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution, states would likely have relatively broad authority to meet
new challenges.
F. ARTICLE V
Of course, the Constitution contains within itself the means to
modify its meaning. Article V permits amendment of the Constitution if
approved by two-thirds vote of Congress and three-fourths of the
states. 3°6 The Framers and Ratifiers understood Article V to be a way for
future generations to meet "new challenges and opportunities in the
unforeseeable future [that] might require new approaches."3"
There is currently a sophisticated debate over whether Article V is
an attractive vehicle of amendment.3°s The extent to which one is
persuaded that Article V is sufficiently viable to permit amendment
302. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
303. 389 U.S 347 (1967).
304. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
305. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 , 82 Stat. T97, 211-
225 (codified as amended at i8 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2oo6)); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNrED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, tit. 9, § 9-7 -100 (997), available at http://www.usdoj.govlusao/
eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm ("[Sleveral of Title III's provisions are more
restrictive than what is required by the Fourth Amendment.").
3o6. U.S. CONST. art. V.
307. AMAR, supra note 58, at 285.
308. Compare LEVINSON, supra note 69 (arguing that the Constitution is not sufficiently democratic
and that Article V is not capable of being the means through which it is made more so), with Henry
Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 121, 177 (I996) (arguing that Article V represents a good way to ensure order and stability
with change).
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when necessary, while at the same time sufficiently resistant to change to
preserve the Constitution's enduring character, will correspond to one's
view on whether and to what extent Article V helps originalism meet the
challenge of change.
It is clear that Article V has not been used frequently and that part
of the "blame" for that failure lies at the feet of the relatively high
hurdles Article V places before proposed amendments. However, lack of
amendments alone does not indicate that the Constitution is unduly
difficult to amend.
It is likely that the Constitution would have been amended more
frequently than it has been if the Supreme Court had hewed more closely
to the Constitution's original meaning. Perhaps the best example of this
occurred during the New Deal. President Roosevelt considered a written
constitutional amendment to place the New Deal on solid constitutional
footing.3" In the end, though, the Court's famous "switch in time"
relieved the pro-New Deal pressure for formal constitutional change,
and the New Deal "amendments" came in the form of judicial
precedents."'
This is simply another way of saying that there exists a prodigious
number of nonoriginalist precedents that may have eliminated the
popular support necessary for amendments." Nonetheless, absent
recourse to informal amendments via judicial precedent, Article V
remains a viable option.
Additionally, for many of those nonoriginalist constitutional
doctrines - Ackermanian amendments-that are already in place in the
form of nonoriginalist precedent, the push to eliminate them would
result in quick formal amendment. For instance, Americans are fond of
many of the administrative state's aspects, such as Social Security, and
many of a host of national regulatory regimes. Assuming that an
originalist reading of the Constitution is inconsistent with Social Security,
for example, and there was a judicial threat to the program on those
grounds, it is highly likely that an Article V amendment protecting it
would result. This potential evinces originalism's ability to respond to
change.
There is also a robust debate over whether Article V is the sole
mode of constitutional amendment. Akhil Amar is a well-known
originalist advocate of the position that non-Article V modes are
309. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 70, at 298-301.
310. Id. at 314-15; see also id. at 326-27 (quoting Roosevelt's explanation for not pursuing formal
amendments).
3 11. See Strang, supra note r68, at 430 ("For originalists, the list of nonoriginalist precedents and
constitutional law doctrines built on these precedents is long ... ").
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legitimate." ' Henry Paul Monaghan has written perhaps the best
response to Amar."3 Although I find the evidence in favor of
Monaghan's position more substantial, as I have explained elsewhere,"4
if Amar is correct, and Article V is only one mechanism to alter the
Constitution, then originalism's ability to meet the challenge of change is
bolstered further.
G. NONORIGINALIST PRECEDENT
I have argued elsewhere that a properly understood originalism
would not eliminate all nonoriginalist precedent."5 Here, I will briefly
emphasize how originalism's response to nonoriginalist precedent helps
it meet the challenge of change.
A nonoriginalist precedent is a precedent that is inconsistent with
determinate original meaning. For instance, the original meaning of the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation requires the chance for actual,
physical confrontation of a testimonial witness by the accused.' 6 A case
that holds something other than that is a nonoriginalist precedent."7
I have explained how the normative argument for originalism,
rooted in the concept of the common good, and the original meaning of
"judicial Power" in Article III, combine to require that judges overrule
nonoriginalist precedents except when doing so would cause significant
harm to the common good.' When faced with a nonoriginalist
precedent, a judge, exercising his habits of judicial virtue3"9 and utilizing
the following three factors, must determine whether overruling the
precedent would significantly harm the common good. The three factors
are, (i) the degree to which the nonoriginalist precedent deviates from
the Constitution's original meaning, (2) the degree to which overruling
the precedent would harm rule-of-law values, and (3) the degree to
which the nonoriginalist precedent instantiates nonlegal justice.3"'
312. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, IO43-44 (1988); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 457-59 (1994). Bruce Ackerman,
of course, has built his dualist democracy conception on the claim that non-Article V amendments
have, in fact, repeatedly occurred. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 70, at 350-75 (describing
the process of non-Article V, New Deal constitutional "amendments").
313. Monaghan, supra note 308, at 121.
314. Strang, supra note 24, at 959-62.
315. Strang, supra note 168.
316. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 2; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2o04).
317. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (198o) (permitting admission of an unavailable witness'
statement against a criminal defendant because it bore "adequate indicia of reliability" (internal
quotation marks omitted)), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
318. Strang, supra note 168, at 420, 436-37.
319. See id. at 484-86 (describing the judicial virtues necessary to make these determinations).
320. See id. at 472-79 (describing these factors in detail).
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Originalism's ability to meet the challenge of change is augmented
by its openness to nonoriginalist precedent. The third factor requires
judges to evaluate how effectively the legal norm embodied in the
nonoriginalist precedent rightly orders social relations. This inquiry
encompasses the question of how well the norm fits today's society. If the
norm fits changed conditions better than the original meaning, it is more
likely to rightly order social relations and hence be retained.
The second factor will also, in many instances, counsel against
overruling a precedent because doing so would harm rule-of-law values.
In many areas of the law, nonoriginalist precedents have become
embedded in the law, and social practices that fit the nonoriginalist
precedents but fit less well the Constitution's original meaning, have
encrusted themselves on the precedents. Overruling those precedents
would, therefore, undermine rule-of-law values. This potential for harm
to rule-of-law values counsels against overruling the precedents and
therefore for preserving precedents that fit current social practices.
It is possible that the correct application of this methodology would
permit a significant amount of nonoriginalist precedent to remain
relatively undisturbed."' There are significant reasons for thinking this is
the case including the fact that many of the nonoriginalist precedents,
and doctrines arose in response to (at least perceived) societal changes,
and that some (or many) of these originalism can incorporate.
The New Deal "transformation," for instance, was in large measure
motivated, both on and off the Court, by changes in society.322 The
Justices who participated in modifying constitutional doctrine repeatedly
and explicitly invoked changed conditions as a justification.323 If in fact
the nonoriginalist New Deal precedents are normatively attractive
responses to societal change, then an originalism that can retain some of
them is better able to meet the challenge of change.
IV. MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE
The tools I outlined above provide originalism with the ability to
change constitutional doctrine and other operative legal norms (such as
321. See id. at 480 ("[P]eople may have legitimate differences on the conclusion of this complex
process.").
322. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 70, at 308-09 (quoting Roosevelt's acceptance
speech at the Democratic National Convention); Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical
(Jn)Accuracy of the Brandeis Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis
for Supreme Court Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REv. 969, 1oo-i (2oo8) (noting the New Deal Court's drive
to make constitutional doctrine fit changed economic and social circumstances).
323. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41(I937) (emphasizing the
company's "national scale" and the national effect of its labor relations); West Coast Hotel, Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390 (937) (noting that "economic conditions.., have supervened" since the
Court decided Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
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federal statutes) in response to changes in the broader society. They give
originalism the capacity to meet the challenge of change. A full account
on this point is beyond the scope of this Article. It would require a
description of the original meaning of all of the Constitution's provisions
(or at least the most important provisions), a recounting of societal
change (or at least the most important changes), and an explanation of
how the Constitution's original meaning accommodates the societal
change. However, below I will offer several reasons to think that
originalism can meet the challenge of change.
Despite the chorus of critics who argue that originalism fails as an
interpretative methodology because it cannot meet changed
circumstances, and the intuitive appeal of the criticism, it is a difficult
charge to measure. Even if there is rough agreement on the existence
and extent of societal change, whether a particular change or class of
changes necessitate alteration of constitutional norms is open to dispute.
By way of example, no one disputes that today's economy is more
urban, national in scope, interdependent, and dynamic than that of 1789.
However, those facts do not lead everyone to conclude that the
Commerce Clause's original meaning, which is more narrow than the
Supreme Court's current interpretation,324 is subject to criticism on that
basis. Instead, some argue that the Commerce Clause's original meaning
is either more normatively attractive than the current interpretation,325 or
that the failings of the originalist interpretation of the Clause are smaller
than the harm-however caused36-that would arise by ruling contrary
to the original meaning. Others, of course, have come to the opposite
conclusion.327
324. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101,
loI (2ooi) ("Congress has power to specify rules to govern the manner by which people may exchange
or trade goods from one state to another, to remove obstructions to domestic trade erected by states,
and to both regulate and restrict the flow of goods to and from other nations (and the Indian tribes)
for the purpose of promoting the domestic economy and foreign trade." (emphasis omitted)); Richard
A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1454 (1987) ("The
affirmative scope of the commerce power should be limited to those matters that today are governed
by the dormant commerce clause: interstate transportation, navigation and sales, and the activities
closely incident to them. All else should be left to the states.").
325. Even Justice Thomas, likely the most rigorous originalist on the Court, voices concern over
implementing the Commerce Clause's original meaning. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 6oi
n.8 (I995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although I might be willing to return to the original
understanding, I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental
reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince
us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.").
326. Harm could be caused, for instance, to the legitimacy of the Court by an interpretation
demonstrably at odds with the Constitution's original meaning, which many Americans believe is the
Constitution's binding meaning. See Strang, supra note I68, at 473 n.391 (reviewing sources that
support this proposition).
327. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the
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I will use four examples to test originalism's ability to meet the
challenge of change using the tools outlined above. These examples
involve aspects where many, especially originalism's critics, believe that
there are, first, changed social circumstances and, second, that these
changes require changed constitutional meaning.
The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
provides a good vehicle to illustrate the role of legal standards in
originalism. There has been significant debate over the Clause's meaning
and whether it is a principle of morality."' Focusing on the portion of the
Clause proscribing "unusual" punishments, recent scholarship has found
that it prohibited punishments that were "'contrary to long usage' or
'immemorial usage."'329 On this reading, courts are directed to determine
whether a challenged punishment is "consonant with our longstanding
traditions."330 Thus, if the challenged punishment was altogether new, or
was meted out for a crime regarding which it had not traditionally been
imposed, or was a traditional punishment that was no longer used, it was
constitutionally "unusual."33"'
Courts can apply the legal standard embodied in the Clause to new
punishments that the government may devise. Governments have been
adept at devising new punishments and they have been aided by
increased technical sophistication. Chemical castration, for instance, is a
means to effect castration that states have recently begun to utilize given
its new technical viability.332 An originalist court faced with an Eighth
Amendment challenge to such a statute would apply the Clause's
standard-is this punishment of the sort traditionally prescribed? -to the
new factual circumstance presented by chemical castration statutes.
Reasonable judges may disagree over application of the standard but, in
principle, originalism is able to tackle the challenge of change offered by
the statutes.
The Equal Protection Clause may provide an example of the role
abduced-principle originalism can play in elaborating the Constitution's
Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 697 (2002) ("[I]f our textual and historical analysis is at least
plausible, it should be preferred over Barnett's, which would require dismantling the entire legislative
and judicial framework built upon the Commerce Clause.").
328. See Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 3' HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'y 47, 47 (2008) (noting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is the focus of
interpretative debates).
329. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of 'Unusual': The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to
Cruel Innovation, io2 Nw. U. L. REv. 1739, 1745 (2oo8).
330. Id. at 1816.
331. Id.
332. See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth
Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 577-85 (2oo6) (detailing the
rise of chemical castration in the states).
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original meaning. There is longstanding disagreement over the Clause's
original meaning,333 and today scholars from many different perspectives
have concluded that the history regarding the Clause's original meaning
is opaque.334 As Christopher Wolfe concluded regarding Section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "The original intention of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not clear simply from a reading of it .... [T]he
congressional debate on section I was quite limited .... There were
contradictory statements about the meaning of different clauses, not just
between the amendment's sponsors and opponents, but among its
sponsors as well." '335
This opacity is in contrast to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause received sustained attention during
the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, which explained its
meaning." Further, it had a constitutional antecedent in Article IV,
which had received sustained attention since 1789, upon which the
framers and ratifiers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause could draw.337
Scholars, building on this, have reached-if not unanimity-then
reasonable consensus on the Clause's original meaning."'
The Equal Protection Clause did not receive significant attention
during the framing and ratification debates and the Clause lacked
antecedents.339 As a result, it is difficult to discern a coherent original
meaning for the Clause. The framers and ratifiers clearly did, however,
understand the Clause to prohibit and permit certain archetypal
practices." For instance, the framers and ratifiers of the Clause intended
333. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 2-4 (1988) (describing the history of varying views of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
334. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 140-41 (rev. ed. 1994) ("There was clearly vagueness and some
confusion in the minds of the framers about the actual language of the Amendment and its
relationship to the original Constitution."); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 56 (2oo6) ("The record is less clear [than
the 1866 Civil Rights Act] with regard to which substantive rights [were] encompassed in the broadly
worded provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment."); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1397 (1992) ("Indeed, I hesitate to attribute to most
participants in the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment any precise notion of the
meaning of Section I."); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection -A History of Inquiry, 22
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 540 (1985) (finding that the historical "evidence... is not entirely consistent"
or is "simply ambiguous").
335. WOLFE, supra note 334, at 123-24.
336. ZIETLOW, supra note 334.
337. BARNETT, supra note 8, at 61-63.
338. Id. at 6o-68, 191-203; WOLFE, supra note 334, at 127-3 1; ZIETLOW, supra note 334, at 56-57.
339. See WOLFE, supra note 334, at 140 (stating that the Clause "does not have a clear origin in a
provision of the original Constitution").
340. See id. at 141 (finding that the Framers and Ratifiers had a "fairly clear" understanding of the
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the Clause to eliminate the infamous Black Codes that Southern states
adopted in the wake of the Thirteenth Amendment.' Relatedly, they
clearly aimed to ensure that state "lawmaking and law-enforcing
machinery" was applied to all persons equally.' The historical record is
also fairly clear that the Clause permitted government to enact policies
that uniquely benefited black Americans.343
There were other practices that the framers and ratifiers understood
the Clause to prohibit, permit, or require.' 4 These practices, regarding
which there was a consensus, form the basis for an abduced legal norm.
The norm must capture all of these practices. A possible approximation
of the legal norm abduced from these archetypal practices would be that
states must protect (and may foster) the civil rights of persons, but need
not provide political rights? 5 This norm, unlike the archetypal practices
it is derived from, is applicable to new circumstances.
Congress' use of conscription provides an example of constitutional
construction helping originalism respond to new circumstances. The
Constitution grants to Congress the powers to "raise and support
Armies," "provide and maintain a Navy," and to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.,,, 6 Most agree
that these Clauses authorize Congress to enlist military personnel using
voluntary means. This form of raising military personnel was used by
Congress during the Antebellum Era.47
goals they wished to achieve).
341. CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
70-72 (I98r); see also ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND
THE SUPREME COURT 25 (1960) (stating that the "Black Codes[, enacted] in a number of southern
states,... were designed to restore the substance of slavery in different forms by placing serious
disabilities upon Negroes with respect to contract, ownership of property, access to courts, and the
like").
342. WOLFE, supra note 334, at 139.
343. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427. 430-32 (1997); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754-
87 (1985).
344. Another example is that the framers and ratifiers did not understand the Equal Protection
Clause to grant newly-freed black Americans the right to vote. WOLFE, supra note 334, at 138-39. This
was accomplished by the Fifteenth Amendment, but the issue was central to the framing and
ratification of the Clause and hence was an archetypal practice. Additionally, the framers and ratifiers
saw ending the "failure [of states] to suppress private violence directed largely at Negroes" as another
application the Clause would have. HARRIS, supra note 341. Further, they understood that the Clause
would constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id.
345. The distinction between civil and political rights, common at the time, included in the
category of civil rights the common law rights to property, contract, and tort (and their enforcement),
while political rights were those rights necessary to participate in political life, primarily voting.
ANTIEAU, supra note 341, at 18; HARRIS, supra note 341, at 28; WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 125-27 (1988).
346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
347. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 384-86 (1918) (surveying Congress' tools to raise
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The question of whether or not Congress could use conscription to
raise personnel for the military, however, arose in response to the new
form of total war"'5 initially found in the Civil War,349 and utilized much
more robustly in the two World Wars.35° Total war presented a new
circumstance not contemplated in 1787 to 1789, and many members of
Congress (and of society more generally) believed that conscription was
necessary to meet this new circumstance.
Congress' authority to construct constitutional meaning statutorily
by instituting conscription enabled it to meet the challenges posed by
total war. Keith Whittington has noted that the original meaning of these
Clauses does not determinately answer whether or not Congress could
use conscription.35' Consequently, the decisions by Congress to institute
conscription represent a construction of the Clauses, a construction that
overcame the challenge of change.
Preservation of nonoriginalist precedent is yet another tool
originalists use to meet the challenge of change. As anyone who has
taught administrative law will recognize, many have claimed that much of
the subject matter of the course is inconsistent with the Constitution's
original meaning. Some scholars have argued that administrative
agencies, which blend legislative, executive, and judicial functions,
violate the separation of powers.352 Others have suggested that the
insulation of administrative agencies from the President's discretionary
exercise of personnel and agency decision-making authority, especially in
the context of independent agencies, violate Article II's requirement that
the President wield all "executive Power." '353 Still others have claimed
that the broad delegations of legislative authority that have made the
administrative state possible violate Article I's nondelegation principle.354
On the other hand, proponents of originalism acknowledge that they
face the widespread and plausible belief that societal change has made
the continued existence of the administrative state normatively
attractive.355 In this context, where there is deeply entrenched and widely
armies prior to the Civil War).
348. By total war I mean warfare conducted using all of the available resources of a given society,
where all of a society's servicemembers and materials are marshaled for the purpose of victory.
349. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 386 (detailing Civil War conscription efforts).
350. R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 673-76, 848 (1984).
351. WHITTINGTON, supra note Io, at 12 tbl.1.2.
352. See Arnold I. Burns & Stephen J. Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PACE L.
REV. 575, 579-83 (1987).
353. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, lO7 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1241-45 01994).
354. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 333-34 (2oo2).
355. See Eric R. Claeys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 408-09 (2004) (noting that most scholars agree that "if the
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relied-upon nonoriginalist precedent, originalism may counsel accepting
this change to the Constitution's meaning.
I noted earlier that whether nonoriginalist precedent should be
overruled depends on three factors: degree of departure from the
Constitution's original meaning, harm to rule-of-law values that would be
caused by overruling, and the nonlegal justness of the nonoriginalist
precedent in question.356 Although I cannot defend this claim here, given
the pervasive concern for the potentially tremendous harm to rule-of-law
values caused by overruling the nonoriginalist precedent that legitimated
the administrative state, it is likely that an originalist judge should not
overrule those precedents. 57 As Randy Barnett has observed, at least
some aspects of the administrative state have induced reliance by citizens
and originalism should respect those interests. 5'
Assuming that the administrative state is normatively attractive, and
given societal changes, originalism's ability to accommodate
nonoriginalist precedent enables originalism to meet this challenge of
change. In this instance, the meaning of the Constitution has effectively
changed, and the new governing legal norms, embodied in the
nonoriginalist precedent, adequately fit today's society.
I have shown that, using the tools I outlined above, originalism has
the ability to meet the proffered challenges of change. This alone should
make one wary of facile critical claims regarding originalism's ability to
handle social change. In addition, however, given the theoretical capacity
of originalism -using the six tools outlined above-to accommodate
change, the burden is on originalism's critics. Critics must show that, in
actual instances of social change, originalism must-in order to be a
viable interpretative methodology- accommodate the change in
question. They must show, for instance, that originalism's inability to
meet the challenge of change on one or a host of issues, makes
originalism more unattractive than alternative interpretative
methodologies. To my knowledge, no such attempt has been made, and
instead, critics often rely on superficial charges.
Even if it was shown that originalism could not accommodate an
instance or instances of change, a critic would have to further establish
that originalism could not adjust to the change to a sufficient degree. It
might be the case that originalism's interpretative tools permit
Court were to apply originalism consistently in separation of powers, it would need to invalidate most
of the administrative state").
356. See supra Part III.G (describing how originalism accommodates nonoriginalist precedent);
Strang, supra note 168, at 472-79.
357. Or, overrule and/or limit some precedent.
358. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 257, 266 (2005).
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originalism to alter constitutional and other legal norms to some degree,
but not to the ideal degree, the degree necessary to precisely fit changed
circumstances. However, originalism may accommodate the change
sufficiently such that the harm caused by originalism's less precise fit with
changed circumstances is acceptable, or at least acceptable in light of any
costs incurred in achieving a better, more precise fit.
V. ORIGINALISM RETAINS CRITICAL BITE
An interpretative methodology must have critical bite. Critical bite
is the characteristic of an interpretative methodology to do more than
simply describe and restate the subject data. An interpretative
methodology without critical bite would equate the Constitution's
meaning with whatever the Supreme Court rules is the Constitution's
meaning. It would not have the ability to criticize decisions as wrongly
interpreting the Constitution. As a result, it would not be able to account
for many of the established facets of our legal practice such as dissents,
overruling precedent, and "retroactive" application of legal norms
articulated in a decision."9
Originalism, even with its tools to meet the challenge of change,
retains critical bite. Where there is a coherent, determinate original
meaning, and where there is determinate abduced-norm original
meaning, the Constitution's original meaning presumptively governs.
The Constitution's original meaning is often critical of current
constitutional law.' 60 Large swaths of constitutional law are inconsistent
with the Constitution's original meaning, 36' and originalism will remain
critical of them.
In fact, many critics who employ the challenge of change are
unhappy with originalism precisely because it contains more than de
minimis critical bite. One possible example of this phenomenon is the
recent proliferation of originalisms363  that go by various labels:,,34 , ,65 , ,,366
moderate," abstract, "liberal,"'6 "semantic,"' '  and "broad, '' 6
359. See STEVEN D. SMrH, LAW'S QUANDARY 53-58, 61-62 (2004) (arguing that a plausible
jurisprudential theory must account for these aspects of American legal practice).
360. By constitutional law I mean what the Supreme Court has held the Constitution means. See
FALLON, JR., supra note 3, at iii (describing "the unwritten constitution," which is comprised, in part,
of judicial precedent).
361. Strang, supra note 168, at 430-32 (describing the large amount of nonoriginalist precedent).
362. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REV. 6I I, 618-i9 (1999)
(suggesting that if originalism had not become more compatible with "liberal" political views in the
legal academy, it would not have grown in acceptance as it has).
363. See BARNETT, supra note 8, at 91; Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1592 n.14 (1997) ("[T]he turn to originalism seems so general that citation is
almost beside the point.").
364. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204-
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among others. Each of these originalisms seeks to, in the words of Jack
Balkin-himself an "abstract" originalist 369-avoid "chaining ourselves to
the original understanding [that] will leave our Constitution insufficiently
flexible and adaptable to meet the challenges of our nation's future.""37
Each of these originalisms has mechanisms that allow its proponents to
avoid the critical bite that is unpalatable with standard originalism.
Again, Balkin sees this. His "abstract" originalism permits the
Constitution to "evolve over time, .. . leav[ing] to each generation the
task of how to make sense of the Constitution's words and principles." ''
Critical bite is one of originalism's primary virtues because it can
constrain and channel legal change, thereby avoiding the problems
associated with legal change prompted by "the passions of the
moment." '372 Entrenching constitutional meaning in the Constitution's
original meaning forces legal change to occur only after prolonged
societal reflection, and hopefully consensus, on the proposed change to
constitutional meaning.373 To a certain extent, therefore, the more critical
bite originalism retains, even with its tools of change, the greater its
ability to encourage popular deliberation over legal change.
More importantly, originalism's critical bite calls our constitutional
legal practice back to legitimacy. It stands as a reminder of constitutional
meaning appropriately rooted in and respectful of the Framers' and
Ratifiers' authority to make authoritative decisions for our society's
pursuit of the common good.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I argued that originalism has, within its analytical
quiver, six tools that permit it to effectively surmount the challenge of
05, 214 (1980) (describing "moderate" originalism).
365. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 304-07 (2007); see
also James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 Mo. L. REV. 10, 1O (2007) (describing
Balkin's originalism as "abstract originalism").
366. Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489,
491-93 (2004) (explaining the "liberal originalist project").
367. Dworkin, supra note i55, 119-27 (explaining semantic originalism). Dworkin has disclaimed
adherence to semantic originalism. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1258 n.I8 (997) ("I did not mean, in my brief
remarks, to abandon ... my long-standing opposition to any form of originalism .... ").
368. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1344
(1997) ("In recent years, the originalist premise has also been manifested in the emerging strain of
broad originalism in liberal and progressive constitutional theory.").
369. See Fleming, supra note 365 (describing Balkin this way).
370. Balkin, supra note 365, at 293.
371. Id.
372. WHIrrNGTON, supra note 8, at 52.
373. BARNErr, supra note 8, at loi.
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change. I described those mechanisms, paying particular attention to
abduced-principle originalism because of the novelty of its articulation. I
also argued that, given these tools, originalism is able to meet the
challenge of change, at least sufficiently to permit originalism to remain a
viable candidate for the best interpretative methodology. Lastly, I argued
that originalism retains sufficient critical bite such that it remains a
principled interpretative methodology.
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